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ABSTRACT

Domain name disputes have been the subject of substantial litigation, legislative action, and
scholarly debate over the course of the past fifteen years. Much of the debate is the product of
disagreement concerning whether trademark rights naturally extend into the domain name space
and to what extent those rights are limited by principles of free speech. Gripe sites are paradigmatic
examples of this debate. Society's investment in defining these rights continues to grow, even as the
relevance of domain names may be declining, due to: (1) changes in the way users locate content on
the Internet; (2) the growth of social media and its consequent de-emphasis on top level domain
names; and (3) the dilution of the domain name space.
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FIFTEEN YEARS OF FAME: THE DECLINING RELEVANCE OF DOMAIN
NAMES IN THE ENDURING CONFLICT BETWEEN TRADEMARK AND FREE
SPEECH RIGHTS
JUDE A. THOMAS*

[T]he lightning speed development of the Internet poses challenges for the
common-law adjudicativeprocess-aprocess which, ideally while grounded in the
past, governs the present and offers direction for the future based on understandings
of current circumstances. Mindful of the often unforeseeable impact of rapid
technological change, we are wary of making legal pronouncements based on highly
fluid circumstances, which almost certainly will give way to tomorrow's new realities.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine, if you will, a vast expanse of untouched and highly-accessible land that
has recently been made available for development. We will call this fictional land
"New Domainia." The potential of this unique and virginal tract of land is enormous
and its value is recognized by several parties with competing interests. First, there
are those who wish to erect forums for cultivating free speech. They argue that the
land should be open for use by all members of the public, because its accessibility
provides an enormous opportunity for the exchange of ideas.
These are the
"Activists." A second group seeks to use the land for private commercial interests
that will render profits and increase the public's access to its goods and services.
This group argues that it has a right to use the new property because it provides a
natural and obvious zone of expansion for its adjoining commercial developments.
We will refer to these as the "Commercialists." Finally, a third group consists of
those who have no desire to make use of the land in any manner that is beneficial to
the public; rather, they seek to monetize it, primarily by reselling the property to the
highest bidder or by diverting traffic away from the Commercialists' nearby
businesses. We will label these the "Squatters."
The property is uniquely suited for use by all three groups and the legislature
soon realizes that its existing zoning laws are not adaptable to development and
regulation of property of this nature. Lawmakers hasten to draft novel zoning laws
for New Domainia, but in the interim, the agency charged with subdividing and
distributing the land has already begun to sell tracts at very low prices. Many of the
early adopters are the Squatters, who engage in a kind of land rush. This is
particularly vexing to the Commercialists, especially when parcels directly adjacent
to their own commercial properties are sold to the Squatters. Likewise, some
Activists who are opposed to the Commercialists' views or practices obtain parcels of
* C Jude A. Thomas 2011. LL.M., University of Akron; J.D., Duquesne University; D.M.D.,
University of Pittsburgh School of Dental Medicine; B.A., Washington & Jefferson College. E-mail:
JudeAlexanderThomas@gmail.com. The author would like to thank Professors William D. Rich and
Jeffrey M. Samuels for their invaluable support.
1Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 584 (24 Cir. 2000).
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land immediately adjacent to the Commercialists' holdings, which they use as venues
to protest the Commercialists. In doing so, the Activists easily attract the attention
of potential consumers of the nearby Commercialists' goods and services.
Land in New Domainia continues to be divided and sold inexpensively to
thousands of purchasers. The resulting tension among competing interests leads to
substantial litigation. Eventually, the legislature does enact laws designed to protect
the business goals of the Commercialists and the free speech goals of the Activists,
while preventing the Squatters from using the land in a manner that is bereft of
benefit to the public. For the most part, the laws are effective in accomplishing these
goals, but they also spawn several new difficulties. Foremost, the new laws are
broadly articulated and tribunals sometimes have difficulty distinguishing between
the Activists' legitimate free speech objectives and the more nefarious goals pursued
by the Squatters. As a result, many Activists are mislabeled as Squatters and their
land is confiscated under the new legislation. Further, the new zoning laws are not
the sole legal framework applicable to the distribution of the land. Due to the unique
geographic nature of New Domainia, which stretches across international borders,
disputes over ownership are also brought before an international arbitration forum.
This forum is highly streamlined and its panels provide expedited decisions in New
Domainian land disputes, but these decisions are not always in harmony with the
growing precedent built upon the local zoning laws. For that matter, the arbitration
forum's decisions are often inconsistent from one panel to the next.
Ultimately, the streamlined nature of the arbitration forum, the rapidly growing
appreciation for the value of land in New Domainia, and the legal uncertainty over
ownership rights combine to yield even more litigation. The number of disputes
decided by tribunals increases every year and this persists for a dozen or so years.
The parties who walk away from these disputes are often disgruntled. The Activists
frequently cannot afford the cost of defending their rights to own land in New
Domainia and consequently they simply capitulate when confronted with lawsuits.
The Commercialists are better funded, but they often find themselves the victims of
delay in failing to capitalize upon opportunities for expansion into the new realm.
Finally, the Squatters are bluntly forced out of the equation under the new
legislation.
New Domainia has proven to be a valuable resource for all three competing
interests, but at substantial cost. It is ultimately divided in a manner that is
somewhat haphazard and critics argue that despite the best intentions of the
legislature, the result is a melange of property interests that are not well-defined or
ideally utilized. This is particularly frustrating to the public at large, who encounter
uncertainty in seeking out establishments in New Domainia.
And then an interesting thing happens. While the skirmishes are happening in
New Domainia, parallel tracts of land are gradually being developed nearby. These
new developments, located outside of New Domainia, are governed by a different
model, largely managed by private interests rather than the legislature. The zoning
laws and dispute resolution process enacted to govern disputes in New Domainia
does not extend to the new territories. Commercialists, Activists, and Squatters
continue to purchase, utilize, and squabble over land in New Domainia, but the
public increasingly shifts its attention to the new privately-managed territories,
which appear to provide a more predictable gateway. This shift is encouraged by the
developers of the new territories, who seek to capture revenue by diverting the
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public-and correspondingly those entities that compete for the public's attention-to
the newer realms. In response, Commercialists and Activists begin to focus their
resources on expansion and visibility outside of New Domainia. In less than two
decades, New Domainia has transitioned from an untouched land of seemingly
limitless opportunities to a realm troubled by litigation, uncertainty, and declining
relevance.
This rather lengthy analogy serves to illustrate the past, present, and likely
near-future of domain name disputes. With the rapid growth of the Internet and the
World Wide Web in the 1990s came a new medium in which users found
opportunities for both commercial enterprise and the exercise of free speech.
Businesses discovered a new market through which to promote and sell their goods
and services, while speech advocates recognized the Internet as a new and powerful
tool through which to assert their First Amendment rights. Like New Domainia, the
Internet provided an enormously valuable new territory for these groups. 2 To
businesses, it was a previously unimagined retail tool of instantaneous global reach.
To speech advocates, it was an inexpensive and easily-accessible platform for
expressing views to a vast audience, placing activists essentially on par with
corporations, governments, and other well-funded entities in the advocacy arena. To
both, domain names became critical gateways to the content that they posted on the
Internet, because they provided a simple means for Internet users to locate that
content.
From the beginning, the registration of domain names provided early
entrepreneurs with an opportunity to make virtual land grabs. This virtual land
rush has been likened to the rapid settlement of land that accompanied the
Homestead Act. 3 Under the Act, any person could claim up to 160 acres of public
land, provided that they settled the land and occupied it continuously for five years. 4
Apart from the costs associated with improving and protecting the land,
homesteaders were required to pay only a nominal filing fee to acquire rights to settle
the land.5 This resulted in the conversion of millions of acres of prairie land into
prosperous farm land and unified the nation through the integration of remote
territories into states. 6 However, the Homestead Act suffered from many failings as
well, among them its abuse by large corporate entities which used it to increase the
size of their holdings at the expense of other, less well-funded entities that might
have benefitted from the use of the land. 7

2See, e.g., Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1168 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (stating the Internet "is an efficient means for business to disseminate information, but it also
affords critics of those businesses an equally efficient means of disseminating critical commentary").
3 Homestead Acts, ch. 75, § 1, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1986); see Ned Snow, The Constitutional
Failing of the Anticybersquatting Act, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 54-55 (2005); Anupam Chander,
The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715, 763 (2003); Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal
Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207, 1227-32 (2002).
WILLARD WESLEY COCHRANE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE:
A
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 81 (Univ. of Minn. Press, 2d ed. 1993) (1979).

, Id.
SSee JASON PORTERFIELD, THE HOMESTEAD ACT OF 1862: A PRIMARY SOURCE HISTORY OF THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE AMERICAN HEARTLAND IN THE LATE 19TH CENmURY 5 (Rosen Central Primary
Source, 2005).
SCOCHRANE, supra note 4, at 82.
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In a similar fashion, the adoption of domain names has helped the Internet
proliferate and unify, but the associated low-cost virtual land rush has been
vulnerable to abuse. Corporate entities have sought to control premium domain
spaces in their own economic interests, sometimes at the expense of others with
legitimate and arguably more altruistic intentions. At the same time, bad faith
registrants have obtained domain names as a means to trade upon the good will of
trademark owners. One manner in which this has been accomplished is through the
registration of domain names identical or confusingly similar to the trademarks of
others. Such domain names can be used to divert consumer traffic to commercial
websites not affiliated with the owners of those trademarks. In addition, domain
names of this nature have been registered and leveraged as means to extort money
from interested trademark owners, a phenomenon commonly known as
cybersquatting. 8
The real property analogy is not perfect, however. The distinction between real
property disputes and domain name disputes is one of ownership compared to
entitlement. Generally, real property lines are readily ascertainable. Moreover, real
property disputes are rarely concerned with the entitlement to possess or use real
property, except where eminent domain issues and zoning regulations are concerned.
In contrast, domain name rights are mitigated by both trademark rights and by the
First Amendment. Consequently, rights to possess domain names yield to issues of
entitlement and correspondingly virtual property rights are far less absolute. The
interplay between trademark rights and the First Amendment presents particular
challenges in determining where such entitlement lies.9
One product of the evolution in speech that arrived with the World Wide Web
was the emergence of Internet gripe sites. Legitimate Internet gripe sites are
websites that are utilized to criticize others, express controversial opinions, and raise
awareness of matters of public interest. The practice of utilizing domain names for
this purpose is sometimes referred to as cybergriping. The targets of gripe sites are
most often corporations and recognizable public figures. Despite the propensity of
critical speech to raise the ire of its target, it is nevertheless entitled to the full
protection of the First Amendment.10
Trademark
owners
(Commercialists),
cybergripers
(Activists),
and
cybersquatters (Squatters) have all sought to make use of domain names as a form of
valuable real estate in cyberspace. Disputes over domain names have been the cause
of much consternation for judicial and arbitral bodies and a great deal of criticism
has been leveled at inconsistent regulation in this realm." At the most fundamental
8See DaimlerChrysler v. The Net Inc., 388 F.3d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 2004).
cybersquatting' occurs when a person other than the trademark holder registers
the domain name of a well-known trademark and then attempts to profit from
this by either ransoming the domain name back to the trademark holder or by
using the domain name to divert business from the trademark holder to the
domain name holder.
Id.
SSee infra Part JJ.B and accompanying text.
U.S. 15, 25 (1971); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-04, 508 (1984).
11See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Bad Faith in Cyberspace: Grounding Domain Name Theory in
Trademark, Property, and Restitution, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 447, 457-62 (2010); see e.g., Madonna
Ciccone, p/k/a Madonna v. Dan Parisi and "Madonnacom,' WIPO Case No. D2000-0847 (Oct. 12,
10See Cohen v. California, 403
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level, cybergriping is a legitimate unauthorized use of trademarks for the purpose of
conveying critical speech.
In contrast, cybersquatting is simply the misuse of
trademarks for personal gain. The devil is in the details, however, as distinctions
between the two sometimes prove to be elusive.
This difficulty has been the cause of substantial debate concerning the
appropriate balance between trademark rights and free speech rights in the context
of domain name disputes, much of which has centered upon interpretation of the
statutory language that has been adopted to address these disputes. New national
and international legal frameworks were drafted in the 1990s to attempt to curtail
cybersquatting and strike a fair balance between free speech and trademark rights.
Today, enforcement under those frameworks remains very active, but tribunals often
render decisions that are inconsistent.12
Some fifteen years of furious litigation and scholarly debate have passed since
the first domain name disputes. Despite the legal and economic significance of this
period, disputes over domain names may ultimately amount to an ephemeral phase
in the evolution of the law in response to the growth of an ever-evolving Internet, an
effect largely attributable to the gradual attenuation of the importance of domain
names to the public. There are several phenomena that may contribute to this effect.
First, technological spaces on the Internet continue to emerge and broaden. These
spaces, which include blogs and other social media like Facebook and Twitter, fall
outside of the scope of the current legislation available to govern domain name
disputes, providing new outlets for exploitation by trademark owners, cybergripers,
and cybersquatters. Second, the nature of search on the Internet is evolving in a
manner that diminishes the relevance of domain names as tools to locate content on
the World Wide Web. This is largely attributable to the expanding number of domain
names that are in use and to the explosive growth of Google's search services as an
alternative means to locating content. Finally, a recent mandate to add a broad new
component arm to the current domain name system will potentially introduce
thousands of new organization-specific domain names. In turn, this may lead to a
kind of dilution of the domain name system that is ultimately more frustrating than
useful to the public.
This article traces the path of domain name disputes over the past fifteen years,
with a particular focus on the conflict between free speech and trademark rights. It
then considers changes that are underway in the manner in which domain names are
employed and how this may affect their use or disuse in the future. Part I of the
article provides an overview of the domain name system and the technical nature of
gripe sites. Part II briefly surveys the tension between trademark rights and free
speech rights. Part III examines the legal frameworks that have been used to
balance these rights in the context of domain name disputes, while Part IV analyzes
the difficulties judicial and arbitral bodies have experienced in reaching
2000) (illustrating how the conflict over whether registration in "some jurisdiction" is sufficient to
show an interest is more complicated in a case like this where, arguably, "fair use" is involved);
Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, Toward a Bright-Line Approach to [Trademarhjsucks.com, 20
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAWYER 7, 1 (2003) (explaining that a bright-line rule for permitting
pejorative domain name achieves a degree of Internet 'zoning' with minimal costs, spares trademark
holders the difficulty of litigation, and delineates a self-identifying zone where online protest will not
run afoul of trademark law).
12See infra IV and accompanying text.
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determinations in such disputes when free speech is a factor. Part V considers
several factors that may contribute to a lessening of the significance of domain names
to the public. Finally, Part VI offers some predictions about the impact that these
factors may have upon free speech and trademark rights.

I. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND

A. The Domain Name System
In the broadest sense, the domain name system is simply a hierarchical naming
system. Every computer connected to the Internet is assigned a unique numerical
identifier known as an internet protocol ("IP") address.' 3 IP addresses serve to
identify individual computers and make it possible for computers to locate one
another on the internet. These addresses consist of four numeric strings ranging
from 0 to 255, separated by periods, for example, 72.32.89.241. A portion of each IP
address represents the network that the computer utilizes, and the remaining
portion identifies the individual server machine where the hosted web content
resides.
Because it would be difficult to remember the numeric addresses which
computers utilize to locate one another via the Internet, an addressing system known
as the Domain Name System ("DNS") was developed to associate IP addresses with
more memorable domain name addresses consisting of alphanumeric text.14 When
an Internet user types a domain name into the address box of a web browser, a
request is sent to a remote domain name server to query the IP address associated
with that domain name. The name server then reports the IP address to the browser
and the browser attempts to make a connection to the computer located at that
numeric address. In this sense, a name server acts as a sort of automated phone
book for Internet users. Once the domain name is translated into an IP address and
the connection is made, web content stored on the remote computer is sent to the
user's browser and a web page appears.15
In the above example, the IP address 72.32.89.241 is the location of a computer
that hosts content located at <www.law.com>. Thus, if a user types <www.law.com>
into a browser address box, the user's browser will report <1aw.com> to a name
server and request the associated IP address, and it will be informed that the user's
desired content is located on a server located at 72.32.89.241.16 The user's browser
then requests and is provided with content including html code, images, etc., which
are integrated by the user's browser to render the Law.com web page.
'8

For a more detailed overview of the domain name system, see PRESTON GIRALLA, HOW THE

INTERNET WORKS 29-33 (Stephanie J. McComb, et al. eds.,

Que

2007) (1998).

See id.
Id.; see Intermatic, Inc., v. Toepppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1231 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (explaining
that "rw]hen the web server receives an inquiry from the Internet, it returns the web page data in
the file to the computer making the inquiry").
1o Most, if not all, browsers will also recognize an IP address entered directly. Thus, if a user
enters 72.32.89.241 into a browser address box, the browser will access and load content from
Law.com's server immediately without first performing a DNS query.
'
'5
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The significance of domain names in this context is obvious: users rely on
domain names to guide them to websites easily and website creators, in turn, register
memorable domain names that they hope will serve as gateways to their content.

B. The Structure of Domain Names
Domain names may be broken into two primary segments: a top level domain
For example, in the address
("TLD") and a second level domain ("SLD").17
<BMW.com>, the top level domain is .com, while the second level domain is BMW.
The most common TLDs are generic TLDs ("gTLDs"), which include .com, .net, and
.org, among others.' 8 Together, the TLD and SLD form the most frequentlyrecognized segment of a web page address. A full web page address is also commonly
referred to as a URL, short for uniform resource locator, which might appear as
<http://www.BMW.com>.
Third level domains, also referred to as subdomains, exist as well. For example,
the
term
"corporate"
is
a
subdomain
in
the
following
URL:
<http://corporate.BMW.com>. Finally, a complete website address may also contain a
"path" or "resource path," which provides direction to a specific resource located on
the given server.' 9 In the following fictitious URL, "owners-manual.pdf' is the
resource path: <http://www.BMW.com/owners-manual.pdf>. For purposes of this
article, the use of the phrase "domain name" will refer solely to the commonlyrecognized combination of a top level domain and second level domain, e.g.,
<BMW.com>.

C. The Nature of Gripe Sites
When domain name disputes arise and free speech is a central concern, gripe
sites are often the subject of such disputes. Most broadly defined, a gripe site is any
Internet website that is used as a platform for critical speech. Both informal
consumer complaint clearinghouse websites like <www.ripoffreport.com> 20 and long17Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1231.
8 Some additional generic top level domains include .edu, .biz, .gov, info, and aero. Nongeneric top level domains include the country code top level domains ("ccTLDs") such as .ru (Russia)
and it (Italy) and the internationalized top level domains ("iTLDs"), which contain special
characters, such as the Cyrillic alphabet characters cb and H. This discussion will focus primarily on
generic top level domains ("gTLDs"), as these are typically the subject of gripe site disputes.
19Some panels and courts have also referred to resource paths as "post-domains," in reference
to the fact that this portion of the URL occurs to the right of the domain name. See, e.g., Romantic
Tours, Inc. v. Whois Privacy Protection Serv., Inc., NAF Claim No. FA1003001316557 (Apr. 28,
2010) (noting that "the UDRP does not offer relief for infringements via use of registered trademarks
in post-domains") (emphasis added).
20 Notably, several attempts to shut down the website <www.ripoffreport.com> have failed.
See MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., No. 3:02-CV-2727, 2004 WL 833595, at *8 (N.D.
Tex. Apr. 19, 2004); Hy Cite Corp. v.Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 418 F.Supp. 2d 1142, 1148 (D.
Ariz. 2005); Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, L.L.C., No. 07-0956, 2007 WL 2949002, at
*3 (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2007); GW E quity, L.L.C. v. Xcentric Ventures, L.L.C., No. 3:07-CV-0976, 2009
WL 62173, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2009).
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established consumer review sites like <consumerreports.org> could be considered
gripe sites, since these sites contain comments of public interest about products and
services. The web contents of such sites-that is, the text and media that appear on
the pages of those sites-necessarily include the trademarks of others, in order to
identify the entity that is the subject of the site's criticism. This alone is a common
cause for concern for trademark owners who closely guard the use of their marks.
More often, however, the term gripe site is used to refer to a website that not
only contains content concerning the target of its criticism, but also makes use of the
target's name within the domain name that is associated with the gripe site, e.g.,
<walmart-sucks.com>.21 Such use is the most frequent basis for gripe site domain
name disputes asserted by trademark owners. For purposes of this discussion, gripe
site domain names that incorporate some variation of a trademark may be referred to
as incorporative gripe site domains. Such domain names typically appear in four
forms, one of the most common and most disputed forms being the trademarkidentical or <trademark.com> variety, in which the second level domain is identical
to the trademark owned by the target of the gripe site, e.g., <pepsicola.com>. Both
cybergripers and cybersquatters usually succeed in registering domain names of this
variety by acquiring them before the trademark owner commences to obtain the
domain itself (the land rush approach), or through the use of a parallel top level
domain like .net or .org., e.g., <pepsi.net> (the alternate TLD approach). Upon
encountering a <trademark.com> gripe site domain, an otherwise-unaware Internet
user may assume that it is affiliated with or endorsed by a trademark owner whose
mark it is identical to, at least until that user views the associated gripe site content.
Websites utilizing the <trademark.com> format typically attract a high volume of
traffic, particularly when the corresponding trademark is well-known.
The second category of incorporative gripe site domain names appear in the form
<trademark+pejorative.com>, for example <walmart-sucks.com> and <stopBP.com>.
These are often referred to simply as <trademark-sucks.com> domain names.
Critical speech is inherent and immediately recognizable in this form: the pejorative
term strongly implies a link to a site expressing discontent. Users who view such
domains are less likely to believe that the domain name is affiliated with or endorsed
by the targeted trademark owner when they encounter them.
A third and related category are those gripe site domain names that appear in
the form <trademark+modifier.com>, in which the modifier is a term that is not
clearly pejorative. Initially, it is more difficult for an Internet user to determine
whether a domain name of this nature is being used as a source indicator by a
trademark owner or as a gateway to speech about the trademark owner. For
example, <walmartwatch.com> suggests equal possibilities for endorsement by or
critical comment concerning Wal-Mart. 22
Finally, gripe site domain names may appear in typosquatted format, whereby
the domain name is an intentional close misspelling of the target trademark owner's
21By their very nature, gripe sites and Internet content as a whole tend to be ephemeral. It is
likely that by the time this article is published and disseminated, some of the references provided
here as examples will have passed into the cyber-ether.
22As it happens, <walmartwatch.com> falls into the latter category. It aggressively works
"with policy-makers, community leaders and others to encourage Walmart to set industry standards
that supports stronger local economies and a strong middle class." See About, WALMART WATCH,
http://walmartwatch.org/about (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
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mark.
Examples might include <generalectric.com>, <gooogle.com>, and
<wwwsears.com> (note the missing dot in the third example). The practice of
typosquatting, more commonly utilized by cybersquatters, has occasionally been
adopted by cybergripers as a means to attract a larger audience to their speech. 23
It is worth noting that while this discussion focuses on gripe sites, gripe sites
have close cousins in parody sites and fan/enthusiast sites. Parody sites largely form
a sort of subcategory of gripe sites, with subtle differences in the approach employed
by their creators. Fan sites, by contrast, are usually created to pay homage to
celebrities, authors, artists, and products, although there is sometimes a commercial
motive as well. The latter typically contain information and media related to the
well-known person or group and may include creations inspired by their work. These
sites, and often the domain names at which they are hosted, incorporate the
trademarks of the artist or author. The intended expression inherent in parody sites,
gripe sites, and fan sites is different, but the manner of use of domain names in
association with such sites is often identical. Consequently, domain name disputes
concerning parody sites and fan sites tend to involve legal arguments and judicial
treatment that is similar to gripe site domain name disputes. 24
The focus of this article on gripe sites is partly for simplicity, but also due in part
to the greater attention that gripe sites tend to receive as the subject of mainstream
litigation. This effect is likely due to the heightened protections that this form of
speech-critical speech-receives under the First Amendment and the substantial
harm that such speech may cause trademark owners.

II. THE TENSION BETWEEN TRADEMARK AND FREE SPEECH RIGHTS

A. Historical Context
On a fundamental level, trademark rights and free speech rights have enjoyed a
rocky relationship. The First Amendment protects the expression of speech, while
trademark law provides a restraint on the expression of speech by granting
trademark owners limited exclusive rights to the use of words and symbols.
Our founding fathers included an express provision in the Constitution for the
protection of free speech, which is as succinct as it is eloquent. The First Amendment
decrees: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
23 See, e.g., Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2005) (asserting infringement
against gripe site operator who registered <fallwell.com>, which is an intentional misspelling of
Reverend Jerry Falwell's name and website <falwell.com>).
21See, e.g., Kevin Spacey v. John Zuccarini, NAF Claim No. FA0103000096937 (May 8, 2001)
(ordering transfer of <kevinspacey.com> to actor Kevin Spacey); Estate of Gary Jennings and Joyce
0. Servis v. Submachine and Joe Ross, WIPO Case No. D2001-1042 (Oct. 25, 2001) (denying transfer
of <garyjennings.com> to the owners of deceased author's intellectual property); Utah Lighthouse
Ministry v.Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d1 1045, 1058 (10th Cir. 2008) (affirming
that the safe harbor provision of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act protected
defendants' parody site).
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government for a redress of grievances." 25 Though concise, this provision stands on
the shoulders of thousands of years of democratic ideology dating at least as far back
as ancient Greece. Perhaps because of this, disputes concerning the extent and
nature of the right to engage in free speech tend to be as much philosophical as they
are political.
Justifications for free speech may be said to include: (1) promoting the search
for truth; (2) encouraging individual autonomy through self-expression or selfrealization; and (3) enabling democratic self-rule. 26 Critical speech fits squarely
within these theories. Specifically, the search for truth has been said to include the
need to protect dissident speech and promote adversarial dialogue. 27 Essentially,
individuals cannot test societal conventions without the freedom to express ideas
contrary to those conventions. This approach has sometimes been characterized as
the marketplace for ideas. 28 Similarly, the quest for individual autonomy relies upon
freedom from the restraint of one's opinion. Autonomy is the product of selfdevelopment through the exercise of an inherent human right: the right to express
oneself.29 Expression, by definition, includes opinion, and opinion necessarily
includes criticism. Finally, the protection of critical speech, particularly speech
critical of government, may be viewed an essential component of democracy.
However, scholars disagree as to the breadth of this third theory: some attribute an
expansive definition, concluding that all speech concerning issues of public interest
must be permitted for effective self-government in a democracy; others argue that
only speech explicitly concerned with political matters is protected by the First
Amendment under this theory.30
In any event, only the narrowest justifications among theories supporting the
protection of free speech could be said to arguably exclude critical speech.
Correspondingly, American jurisprudence has historically been firmly protective of
those who engage in speech that is of a critical nature. 3 ' Such protection has been

25 U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
26 See KEITH WERHAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 28-38 (Praeger, 2004).
27Id. at 32-34.
281d. at 35.
29
1d. at 35-37.

'30 Id. at 29-31.
31See e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (stating "i]f there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the
remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence"); SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 24 554,
565 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (denying injunction against defendant's criticism of plaintiffs product because
"the public interest favors robust criticism of plaintiffs' [product]"); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214
F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating 'just because speech is critical of a corporation and its
business practices is not a sufficient reason to enjoin the speech"); Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319
F.3d 770, 778 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating "the First Amendment protects critical commentary when
there is no confusion as to source, even when it involves the criticism of a business"); L.L. Bean, Inc.
v. Drake Pub's., Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that if a statute could 'enjoin the use of
[a] mark in a noncommercial context found to be negative or offensive, then a corporation could
shield itself from criticism by forbidding the use of its name in commentaries critical of its conduct").
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particularly generous in those instances in which the target of the criticism is a
business or public figure.32
Legitimate gripe sites are paradigmatic for protected critical speech: they
provide an easily-accessible and widely distributed forum for identifying issues
concerning people and enterprises that are of interest to the public. Typically, the
targets of gripe site criticism are businesses and recognized public figures.
In contrast to free speech rights, trademark rights are not explicitly referenced
in a provision of the U.S. Constitution. The Progress Clause3 3 of the Constitution has
been interpreted to grant Congress the power to regulate other forms of intellectual
property rights, namely copyrights and patents, but the Supreme Court has held that
there is no similar grant of authority in this clause permitting Congress to regulate
trademarks, because they do not qualify as "the fruits of intellectual labor . . . ."34
However, in the late 1800s, Congress narrowed existing U.S. trademark law by
adding a provision that limited the federal government's power to regulate only those
trademarks which are used in interstate commerce. 35 This added requirement placed
trademark regulation squarely within the scope of the Commerce Clause, which
allows Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes." 36 The derivation of authority from this
clause remains the basis for trademark rights today: the "use in commerce
requirement fundamental to securing and maintaining trademark registrations has
survived all subsequent revisions of U.S. trademark law and it persists in the current
statute.3 7
Like free speech rights, the justifications for trademark rights are also grounded
in differing philosophies. One view suggests that trademark law exists to protect
consumers from confusion and deception by providing reliable indicators of the
sources of goods and services in the marketplace.3 8 Others hold that trademark law
should protect the producers of those goods and services from the misappropriation of
the goodwill that they have worked to create.39 Most contemporary theorists agree
that these goals, by necessity, function in harmony. 40 The Supreme Court has
espoused this view as well:

32Even speech that is false and defamatory has been granted limited protection under the
First Amendment, when it involves a public official or public figure. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Curtis Publ'g. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152-54 (1967).
33 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
' In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
35 This requirement was first included in the Trademark Protection Act of 1881, ch. 138, 21
Stat. 502 (repealed in part and amended in part by Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724
(1905)).
36 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006) (stating that registration may be sought for marks "used in
commerce"); see also id. § 1127 (defining commerce to mean "all commerce which may lawfully be
regulated by Congress").
38See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:1 (4th
ed. 2000) [hereinafter MCCARTHY].
ED
Id.
40Id.; see RObert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 560-61 (2006).
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In principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a sourceidentifying mark, 'reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and making
purchasing decisions,' for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer
that this item-the item with this mark-is made by the same producer as
other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past.
At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an
imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards
associated with a desirable product. 4 1
In any case, the protection of trademarks has proven to be of enormous value to
society. Trademarks have been shown to encourage competition, a fundamental
component of a system of free enterprise. 42 Trademarks may also be said to have
economic value, in the sense that they reduce the costs of consumer searching by
providing simpler means of identifying the nature and quality of goods. 43 Finally,
there are social justifications for protecting those trademarks that serve as cultural
icons: society initially responds to the source-identifying value of a trademark, but in
some cases, it transcends that value by expanding the meaning of a trademark to
something greater. 44 This is evident in marks akin to ELVIS, BARBIE, and COCACOLA. 45
Of course, trademark law is also the regulation of speech, specifically
commercial speech. Commercial speech has been defined as speech that proposes a
commercial transaction, 46 and trademarks may be said to fit within this description.
In essence, then, the tension between trademark rights and free speech rights is a
kind of property dispute, in the sense that parties on both sides wish to assert
dominion over speech for different and sometimes competing purposes. In particular,
trademark owners seek to create a distinctive and inalienable association between
speech and their commercial products and services, while free speech advocates seek
to use the same or similar speech to convey commentary. Like the hypothetical land
in New Domainia, when platforms for such speech are inexpensively obtained and
highly accessible to the public, their value to both parties increases proportionally.

41Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod's. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (quoting 1 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01 (3d ed. 1994)).
42KENNETH L. PORT, TRADEMARK LAW AND POLICY 29-30 (2d ed. 2008).
43
1d. at 30-32.
4' Id. at 32-33.
45 See, e.g., Mattel v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (claiming that producers

of a song titled "Barbie Girl" which is allegedly a parody about the plaintiffs Barbie valued mark
and recognizable character); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 792 (S.D. Tex.
1996) (arguing that defendant's THE VELVET ELVIS service mark is the focal point of the bar's
name, decor, and advertisements, and as such infringes on the use of Elvis Presley's name and
reputation); The Coca-Cola Co. v.Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1186-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(seeking to enjoin defendant from printing, distributing, and selling commercially a poster which
consists of an exact blown-up reproduction of plaintiffs familiar COCA-COLA trademark and
distinctive format except for the substitution of the script letters "ine" for "Cola", so that the poster
reads "Enjoy Cocaine").
46See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001) (citing Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)).
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B. Tension in Domain Name Disputes
Tension between free speech and trademark rights in the context of domain
name disputes exists on two levels. On one level, a cybergriper who registers an
incorporative domain name may argue that the use of another's trademark in its
domain name is appropriate because it is merely being used as a kind of gateway to
web content that constitutes protected critical speech describing the target
trademark owner. Speech advocates view this approach as a form of fair use, since
the domain name does indeed guide Internet users to content describing the target.
The opposing view is that this is an abuse of the exclusive rights obtained by
trademark owners through commercial use of their marks, since it may lead to
consumer confusion and weaken the distinctiveness of the owner's trademark.
On a second level, a cybergriper may assert that the domain name itself
comprises expressive speech, particularly when the incorporative domain is of the
<trademark+pejorative.com> variety, for example, <ford-sucks.com>. Most American
courts have held that such pejorative domain names constitute a form of expressive
speech and are therefore subject to the protections of fair use and the First
Amendment. 47
Where
expressive
speech
is
not
clear,
as
in
<trademark+modifier.com> domain names, or where such speech is absent
altogether, as in <trademark.com> domain names, tribunals have been more
reluctant to extend these protections. 48

III. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS THAT BALANCE TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
IN DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES

A. State Remedies and the Early Lanham Act
Prior to the mid-1990s, the trademark infringement provisions of the Lanham
Act were the sole source of federal law available to aggrieved trademark owners
engaged in domain name disputes. 49 Trademark owners also relied upon state law
claims for trademark dilution, unfair competition, and defamation. However, these
provisions often proved to be an awkward fit, because they were ill-adapted to deal
47 See Name.Space v. Network Solutions, 202 F.3d 573, 585-86 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that
domain names that express a message may be protected); Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770,
778 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that <taubmansucks.com> was purely an exhibition of protected free
speech).
48See Sunlight Saunas, Inc. v. Sundance Sauna, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1065 (D. Kan.
2006) (holding that <www.sunlightsaunas-exposed.com> was not unequivocally communicative in
nature); OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 197-98 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding
that defendant's domain name <www.thebuffalonews.com> was not protected under the First
Amendment because "[u]se of another's trademark is entitled to First Amendment protection only
when the use of that mark is part of a communicative message, not when it is used merely to
identify the source of a product"); Morrison & Foerster, L.L.P. v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1135 (D.
Colo. 2000) (holding that the First Amendment could not be invoked to protect defendant's
incorporative domain names because they lacked a communicative message).
49 The Lanham Act, also known as the Trademark Act of 1946, is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 10511141 (2006).

[11:1 2011]Fifteen Years of Fame: The Declining Relevance of Domain Names
in the Enduring Conflict Between Trademark and Free Speech Rights

15

with the mechanics of trademark use in the modern context of domain name
disputes.
Trademark infringement and unfair competition laws in the United States
require a plaintiff to make a showing of likely consumer confusion, the sine qua non
of trademark infringement. 50 This is based upon the premise that trademarks are
meant to serve as source indicators. If the unauthorized use of a mark in association
with a product is not likely to result in consumer confusion as to the source of a
product, there can be no infringement. 5 1 With respect to gripe site cases, consumers
are rarely confused into believing that a website that contains disparaging remarks
about a trademark owner is actually endorsed by or affiliated with that owner, even
if the site is accessible at a domain name of the <trademark.com> variety. Hence,
the likelihood of confusion element in gripe site cases is frequently absent and a
trademark owner's infringement claim will correspondingly fail. 52
In addition, there are safe harbor provisions included in the Lanham Act that
provide protection against the abrogation of free speech. The protections set forth to
balance the potential monopoly on speech that a trademark provides are subtle, but
they can be read into the Lanham Act through the enumerated fair use defenses,
which are inexorably intertwined with free speech. For example, the Lanham Act
provides a defense to trademark infringement when an alleged infringer makes fair
use of another's trademark in a non-trademark capacity to describe its own product.5 3
Thus, a candy manufacturer that advertises that its own product contains
NutraSweet can claim the defense of classic fair use of the NUTRASWEET
trademark. 54
More often, fair use in the context of gripe site domain name disputes is of a
nominative, rather than descriptive, nature. Nominative fair use occurs when an
alleged infringer makes unauthorized use of another's trademark to refer to the
trademark owner's own product, but does so solely for the purpose of comparison,
criticism, parody, or the like. This transpires when the only practical way to refer to
something is to use the trademarked term; for example, when an independent
automobile mechanic specializing in the repair of Volkswagen automobiles advertises

5015 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1) (relating to the protection of federally registered trademarks
and unregistered trademarks respectively).
51In assessing the possibility of trademark infringement through likelihood of consumer
confusion, courts consider a multitude of factors. Factors commonly cited include the degree of
similarity between the infringing mark and the trademark owner's protected mark, the degree of
similarity of the infringing goods to the trademark owner's goods, the sophistication of the
consumers who are likely to purchase the goods, and the channels of trade in which the respective
parties operate, among others. See In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361
(C.C.P.A. 1973); Polaroid Corp. v. Polaradi Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d1 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
52See, e.g., Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1163-66 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (holding that defendants use of the word "sucks" adjacent to plaintiffs mark would diminish
the likelihood that any "reasonably prudent user would . . . mistake rdefendant's] site for Bally's
official site").
BS
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).
M42 MCCARTHY, supra note 38, § 11:45 (explaining that classic fair use is also sometimes
referred to as descriptive fair use).
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his services, he may properly use the VOLKSWAGEN trademark to describe that
which he repairs. 0
State trademark dilution laws in the mid-1990s were also poor instruments for
addressing domain name disputes.
Only twenty-five states had enacted such
statutes and these were widely inconsistent, although most were based upon some
version of the practice of protecting trademarks from the gradual whittling away of
their distinctiveness through the unauthorized use of similar marks by third
parties. 56
Further, many jurisdictions were reluctant to grant "nationwide
injunctions for violation of state law where half of the states [had] no dilution law."5 7
Many state dilution statutes did share one commonality, however: a claim for
dilution required the plaintiff trademark owner to prove that its mark was being
used in a commercial context, a condition that is often unmet in domain name
disputes. In most gripe site cases, the commercial element is absent because
legitimate gripe sites contain only critical speech, which is noncommercial in nature.
In both cybergriping and cybersquatting cases, the commercial element is absent
when a defendant has beaten the trademark owner to the registration of a
trademark-identical domain name, but has not yet posted any content at a website
associated with that domain name.
Finally, defamation law in the United States is substantially limited by the
protections afforded by the First Amendment. States laws are largely protective of
opinions or statements that the author reasonably believes to be true; hence, most
gripe sites will be protected from defamation claims, except in rare instances in
which knowingly fabricated site content results in perceptible injury to the plaintiff
trademark holder.5 8 Further, such sites may be protected by the Communications
Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA"), which contains provisions that appear to immunize
some parties from tort liability.
While the speakers themselves may not be
immunized under the CDA, site owners, Internet service providers, and other
intermediaries very likely are. 59 This presents an additional hurdle to aggrieved
trademark owners, particularly when gripe sites contain content posted by
anonymous third party users.

5 See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992); see also
Bumble Bee Seafoods, L.L.C. v. UFS Indus. Inc., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1684, 1685-86 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (permitting the use of the BUMBLEE BEE TUNA trademark on a tuna salad package label
because the tuna was made with Bumble Bee brand tuna).
,c See Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 825
(1927).
57V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 2001) rev'd, 537 U.S. 418
(2003) (citing H.R. REP. 104-374. (1995)).
5 See, e.g., Intellect Art Multimedia, Inc. v. Milewski, 899 N.Y.S.2d 60, 60 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2009)
(dismissing defamation claim against defendant cybergriper because his comments were merely
statements of personal opinion, that were "susceptible to ambiguous meanings" and "subjective
expressions of consumer dissatisfaction with plaintiff'); USA Techs., Inc. v. Doe, 713 F. Supp. 2d
901, 908-09 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that scathing comments about plaintiffs corporate officer
were not defamatory because they were accompanied by "exaggerated speech and broad generalities,
all indicia of opinion"); Cornelius v. DeLuca, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1023 (D. Idaho 2010) (dismissing
plaintiffs defamation claim because defendant cybergriper's statements concerning plaintiffs
products appeared to be mere opinion).
80See Shari Claire Lewis, Alleged Defamation on 'Gripe' Sites Challenges Businesses, 242 N.Y.
L.J. 5, 5 (2009).
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B. Trademark Dilution Legislation

1. The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995
In the mid-1990s, new federal legislation began to appear that included some
provisions designed to address the difficulties that judicial bodies confronted in
attempting to adapt the law to adjudicate domain name disputes. The first such
move toward addressing domain name registration concerns was the enactment of
federal trademark dilution laws. Congress' initial attempt to create a federal body of
dilution law was the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 ("FTDA").60 Among its
reasons for drafting the FTDA, Congress specifically set out to address the
trademark issues surrounding domain name registrations. 6 1 However, the FTDA
proved to be an unwieldy tool. For ordinary trademark suits, this was attributable,
in part, to the difficulty that courts encountered in settling upon a uniform definition
of dilution, which the statute failed to provide. In addition, the statute and its
legislative history offered a paucity of guidance with respect to whether a plaintiff
must make a showing of actual dilution, or a simpler showing of a mere likelihood of
dilution. 62 Finally, the FTDA applied only to "famous" trademarks, but it was not
clear whether this included only marks that were widely recognized by the American
public, or also marks that held market-niche fame or fame in limited geographic
regions.63

In domain name disputes, the FTDA was even more difficult to apply. In
addition to the aforementioned challenges, the federal statute resembled its state
predecessors in that it required a plaintiff to make a showing of commercial use. The
legislative intent behind the inclusion of this provision was clear: the FTDA was
narrowly circumscribed to prevent the unauthorized commercial use of trademarks
that could be harmful to the distinctiveness of those marks; it was not meant to limit
60Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006)) [hereinafter FTDA].
G1See 104 Cong. Rec. S19,312 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (stating "it is

my hope that this antidilution statute can help stem the use of deceptive Internet addresses taken
by those who are choosing marks that are associated with the products and reputations of others").
G2 See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003) (illustrating that in 2003,
the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the FTDA standard for dilution required a
plaintiff to prove that another trademark caused actual dilution of the distinctive quality of a
famous mark). This pronouncement, however, proved to be ephemeral, as the decision was
overturned with the subsequent enactment of new legislation.
G See Times Mirror Magazine, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157, 166 (3d
Cir. 2000) (explaining that niche fame isfame among consumers in a local geographic area, or
among consumers in a particular market). For example, the trademark THE SPORTING NEWS
was not found to be famous among the general public, but it enjoyed niche fame within the market
of readers of sports periodicals. Similarly, the owner of the LEXIS trademark was found to have
niche fame among attorneys and accountants, but not the same degree of fame among the general
public that Toyota's LEXUS mark enjoyed. See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,
Inc., 875 F.2d1 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989). Geographic niche fame was found in the Wctwa case, in
which the Third Circuit affirmed that a convenience store located in only five states in the northeast
United States enjoyed niche fame in its WAWA mark due to its extensive advertising over a period
of nearly ninety years in that market. Wawa, Inc. v. Haaf, No. 96-4313, 1996 WL 460083, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 1996) aff'd, 116 F.3d 471 (34 Cir. 1997).
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criticism or commentary. 64 In the most blatant cybersquatting cases, this hurdle was
not particularly difficult to overcome: the commercial element was easy to identify
when opportunists registered trademark-identical domain names and established
commercial websites accessible at those domain names. However, as previously
noted, cybergripers often omit commercial content from their websites. Further, both
cybergripers and cybersquatters who register incorporative domain names may not
initially make use of them, eliminating the commercial element, yet the sting is still
felt by trademark owners with a desire to make use of the domain names that
contain their marks. In this regard, the majority of courts have held that the mere
registration of a domain name does not itself constitute commercial use, although
some have attempted to extend the statute beyond its boundaries to find dilution in
this manner. 65
Ultimately, the FTDA proved to be a clumsy piece of legislation for trademark
owners and it was particularly difficult to apply to domain name disputes.
Consequently, substantial lobbying lead to the further revision of federal trademark
dilution law, as well as the creation of new legal frameworks specifically targeted to
address domain name disputes.

2. The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006
The FTDA was largely supplanted by the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of
2006 ("TDRA"), the current dilution statute.66 In enacting the TDRA, Congress set
out to clarify some of the earlier language of the FTDA and to add certainty for
tribunals and litigants. Dilution was more clearly defined to include both dilution by
blurring67 and dilution by tarnishment.6 8 Further, under the TDRA, a plaintiff need
only make a showing of likely dilution, rather than actual dilution,6 9 and niche fame
was eliminated as a basis for the cause of action.70 Arguably, these changes created
greater certainty for trademark owners by more readily defining the boundaries of
dilution. However, some critics have suggested that the TDRA requires further
clarification with respect to the plaintiffs burden in demonstrating the fame of its
61See, e.g., 104 Cong. Rec. S19,310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (stating
that First Amendment-protected speech would not be affected by the FTDA); H.R. REP. NO. 104-374,
at 8 (1995) (stating that the proposed Act "adequately addresses legitimate First Amendment
concerns' and "will not prohibit or threaten 'noncommercial' expression").
65See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that
defendant traded upon the value of plaintiff trademark owner's marks by possessing domain name
registrations that "curtailed [plaintiffs] exploitation of the value of its trademarks on the Internet").

GG15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2006).
67 Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (explaining that dilution by blurring occurs when a famous mark loses its
distinctiveness due to the use of a similar mark or trade name); see also 4 MCCARTHY, supra note
38, § 24:120 (noting that dilution by blurring has sometimes been described as "death by a thousand
small cuts," a metaphor for the idea that the effect of a single instance of dilution may be perceived
as small, but multiple acts have a cumulative effect which may be fatal to the distinctiveness of the
trademark over time).
68 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C) (explaining that tarnishment is the acquired association between a
famous mark and a similar mark (or trade name) of another, which has the effect of creating
negative associations with the famous mark).
91Id. § 1125(c)(1).
70
o Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
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mark, the requisite similarity between the plaintiffs mark and the defendant's mark,
and the evidence necessary to prove a likelihood of dilution by blurring.' 1 Others
have argued that the TDRA generates an overly-broad dilution remedy that cannot
be justified upon policy grounds. 72
In any event, the commercial use requirement included in previous
permutations of dilution law was maintained in the TDRA,73 as were the safe harbor
provisions for noncommercial use: the current version of the statute states that
dilution will not be found when a trademark is being fairly used in connection with
parody, criticism, or comment concerning the famous mark owner. 74 These safe
harbor provisions are particularly pertinent to gripe site disputes, which typically
make use of language of this nature.

C. Targeted Anticybersquatting Legislation

1. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
The combination of the forgoing elements generated numerous hurdles for
trademark owners who sought to prevent both cybersquatters and cybergripers from
registering and utilizing incorporative domain names. The requirements of confusion
and commercial use in such disputes are often lacking and the protections of the
First Amendment shield cybersquatters and cybergripers indiscriminately. Congress
was well aware of these difficulties when it began drafting new legislation
specifically targeted to address cybersquatting. 75 The Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act ("ACPA") was born as amendments to the Lanham Act in an attempt
to address these concerns.7 6 In enacting the ACPA, Congress sought to:
protect consumers and American businesses, to promote the growth of
online commerce, and to provide clarity in the law for trademark owners by
prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks as
Internet domain names with the intent to profit from the goodwill

71Perla M. Kuhn, Trademarks as Competitive Tools-Obtaining and Protecting them, in
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 7, 20-21 (Aspatore 2009).

72 Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 11 INTELL. PROP.
L. BULL. 187, 194 (2007).
I15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C).
' Id. §§ 1125(c)(3)(A)-(C).
7B See S.REP. NO. 106-140, at 7 (1999).
cybersquatters have become increasingly sophisticated as the case law has
developed and now take the necessary precautions to insulate themselves from
liability. For example, many cybersquatters are now careful to no longer offer the
domain name for sale in any manner that could implicate liability under existing
trademark dilution case law.
Id.
76 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006).
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Broadly, the ACPA prohibits a person from registering or using a domain name
that is identical or confusingly similar to the distinctive or famous trademark of
another, when such acts are done in bad faith.78 Unlike its statutory predecessors,
there is no per se commercial use requirement in the ACPA; rather, the plaintiff
must only show evidence that the defendant manifested a bad faith intent to profit
from its actions. 79
Further, in contrast to the "likelihood of confusion" standard that must be met in
traditional trademark infringement actions, the "confusingly similar" standard set
forth under the ACPA is more easily satisfied.80 In addition, in contrast to the
dilution statutes, actual use of a domain name is not required to show bad faith
under the ACPA; mere registration of the domain name will suffice, provided that the
bad faith intent requirement is met.8 '
Bad faith can be shown through an analysis of nine factors enumerated in a nonexhaustive list provided by the statute. 82 These factors center largely around the
manner in which the domain name is used by the defendant, the intent of the
defendant in registering or using the domain name, and the defendant's past history,
if any, of registering identical or confusingly similar domain names.83
In addition, the ACPA provides plaintiffs with in rem jurisdiction in domain
name disputes when the trademark owner is unable to acquire in personam
jurisdiction over the defendant, or when the trademark owner is unable to determine
the identity of the appropriate defendant. 84 Further, the ACPA expands the

77S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4.
78 15 U.S.C § 1125(d)(1).
7 See Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 778 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating " [t]he use of a domain
name in connection with a site that makes a noncommercial or fair use of the mark does not
necessarily mean that the domain name registrant lacked bad faith"); see also E. & J. Gallo Winery
v. Spider Webs Ltd., 129 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1047-48 (S.D. Tex. 2001) ("As reflected by the language
of the ACPA and the case law interpreting it, there is no requirement. . . that the 'use' be a
commercial use to run afoul of the ACPA.") aff'd, 286 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2002).
8 See, e.g., Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 157 F. Supp. 2d 658, 677 (E.D. Va.
2001) (finding domains consisting of the word "harrods" confusingly similar to plaintiffs HARRODS
trademark); Morrison & Foerster, L.L.P. v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d. 1125, 1130 (D. Colo. 2000) (holding
that domain names which contained various obvious misspellings of Morrison & Foerster were
confusingly similar); but see Lucent Techs. Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 (E.D.
Va. 2000) (noting that <lucentsucks.com> is not confusingly similar to plaintiffs LUCENT mark
because consumers would recognize the parody inherent in the domain name and therefore there
could be no confusion).
8115 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i); see Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir.
2005).
[tihe ACPA makes it clear that 'use' is only one possible way to violate the Act
('registers, traffics in, or uses'). Allowing a cybersquatter to register the domain
name with a bad faith intent to profit but get around the law by making
noncommercial use of the mark would run counter to the purpose of the Act.
Id.
82 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).
Id.
84 1Id.
83

§ 1125(dl)(2).
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potential damages available to a plaintiff to include injunctive relief,85 transfer or
cancellation of the domain name in disputej 6 actual damagesj statutory damages
of $1,000 to $100,000 per domain name,88 and in some cases, attorney's fees.89
Congress included a savings clause in the ACPA to protect the legitimate fair
use of domains names that contain the trademarks of others. The statute proclaims,
rather vaguely, that "[b]ad faith intent. . . shall not be found in any case in which the
court determines that the person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that
the use of the domain name was a fair use or otherwise lawful."90 This provision was
incorporated to protect "the rights of Internet users and the interests of all
Americans in free speech and protected uses of trademarked names for such things
as parody, comment, criticism, comparative advertising, news reporting, etc." 91
Congress also anticipated that cybersquatters might seek to avoid liability under
the ACPA by availing themselves of the savings clause in a spurious fashion. 92
Accordingly, the courts have been sensitive to this potential loophole: in those
instances in which cybersquatters have plainly attempted to cloak their bad faith use
of another's trademark in the mantle of a gripe site, tribunals have held almost
uniformly against protecting the domain name registrant's speech.93
In United States federal courts, the provisions of the ACPA have become the
statutory vehicle of choice for trademark owners who seek redress in domain name
disputes, due to the targeted nature of the statute. Despite this, the ACPA has
enjoyed only moderate use in the courts, having been cited as a cause of action in a

85Id. § 1116(a).
SOId. § 1125(d)(1)(C).
87Id. § 1117(a).
8SSId. § 1117(d).
89Id. § 1117(a) (noting that the court may award the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees
in exceptional cases).
90Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii).
91 S.

REP. No. 106-140, at 8 (1999).

92See H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 11 (1999).
the use of a domain name for purposes of comparative advertising, comment,
criticism, parody, news reporting, etc., even where done for profit, would not alone
satisfy the bad-faith intent requirement ...[the safe harbor provision] is not
intended to create a loophole that otherwise might swallow the bill, however, by
allowing a domain name registrant to evade application of the Act by merely
putting up a noninfringing site under an infringing domain name.
Id.

DB
See Shields v.Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 485-86 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that defendant could
not avail himself of the safe harbor provision of the ACPA when defendant admitted to replacing the
purely commercial content on his alleged gripe site with a protest page mere hours after being
served with plaintiffs complaint); E.& J.Gallo Winery v.Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d1 270, 272 (5th
Cir. 2002) (holding that defendant's use of its domain name inassociation with a website that was
critical of alcohol, corporate America, and the litigation lodged against it six months after the
litigation ensued did not immunize defendant); Sunlight Saunas, Inc. v.Sundance Sauna, Inc., 427
F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1057-58 (D. Klan. 2006) (noting that defendant posted advertisements for
Coca-Cola Co. v.Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 789
plaintiffs competitors services on his alleged gripe site);
(8th Cir. 2004) (noting defendant created anti-abortion speech websites using domain names
confusingly similar to a multitude of famous trademarks).
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little over two hundred cases since its enactment in 1999.94 Of those, 58% have
resulted in a finding of cybersquatting, approximately 30% have found no
cybersquatting, and a little over 10% have been resolved for procedural reasons. 95
The modest number of cases relying upon the ACPA is likely attributable to the
substantial cost and time consuming nature of federal litigation.

2. The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
At about the same time the ACPA was enacted, the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") was formed as a non-profit organization
charged with the oversight of the administration of domain name registrations.96
ICANN soon adopted the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
("UDRP"), 97 an international policy designed to settle disputes between domain
name registrants and trademark owners via arbitration.98 The authority of the
UDRP is grounded in the fact that its terms are incorporated into all domain name
registration agreements and its acceptance by registrants is mandatory in order to
secure a domain name.9 9 One provision of the UDRP requires domain name
registrants to submit to an administrative proceeding-commonly referred to as a
UDRP proceeding-in the event of a domain name dispute.100 These proceedings are
managed by appointed dispute resolution providers, the largest of which are the
World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO"), based in Geneva, Switzerland,
and the National Arbitration Forum, based in the United States. 101 Through these
providers, UDRP proceedings are managed and decided through a compulsory
private dispute resolution process.
Such proceedings are decided by panels
consisting of one or three members, depending upon the preferences of the parties in
opposition.
To prevail in a UDRP proceeding, the complaining party must prove: (1) that
the domain name in question is identical or confusingly similar to the complainant's
94Internet Trademark Case Summaries, FINNEGAN, HENDERSON,

FARABOW, GARRETT &
(last visited Oct. 16,

DUNNER, L.L.P., http://www.finnegan.com/publications/updatenewsletters/ites

2011).

95Id.
96

About
ICANN,
INTERNET
CORP.
FOR
ASSIGNED
NAMES
AND
NUMBERS,
http://www.icann.org/en/about (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
97Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES
AND NUMBERS, http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-policy-24oct99.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011),
[hereinafter UDRP].
98 In the strictest sense of the word, a UDRP proceeding is not truly an arbitration.
The
parties in conflict participate only to the extent that each party submits a brief, following which a
panel of one to three members renders a decision. There is no option for the parties to agree upon
an impartial referee and the parties have the right to later challenge and overturn the panel's
decision in court. However, a UDRP proceeding does take place entirely outside of the courts, much
like a traditional arbitration, and hence it is often referred to in this manner.
99UDRP, supra note 97,
1.
loo Id. 4.
101Other current providers include the Asian Domain Name Dispute Resolution Centre and
the Czech Arbitration Court Arbitration Center for Internet Disputes. See List of Approved Dispute
Resolution Service Providers, INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMVES AND NUMBERS,
http://www.icann.org/en/dlndr/udrp/approvedl-providlers.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
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trademark; (2) that the domain name registrant does not have any rights or
legitimate interests in the domain name; and (3) that the domain name has been
registered and is being used in bad faith.102 ICANN has also provided a list of model
evidence of bad faith, in a manner similar to the ACPA. 103 Like the bad faith factors
enumerated in the ACPA, ICANN's list is not exhaustive. It includes: (1) whether
the registrant registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of selling,
renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant
who is the owner of the trademark or service mark; (2) whether the registrant
registered the domain name to prevent the owner of the trademark or service mark
from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, if the domain name owner
has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; and (3) whether the registrant registered
the domain name primarily for the purpose of disrupting the business of a
competitor; or (4) whether by using the domain name, the registrant has
intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, internet users to the
registrant's website, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's
mark.104

In contrast to the ACPA, the UDRP has been held to require that the registrant
acted in bad faith both in registering and in using the domain name; 0 5 bad faith does
not exist solely upon registration. In addition, the UDRP has no jurisdictional limits,
because it applies wherever domain names are registered through ICANN-approved
registrars.
In contrast to the provisions of the ACPA, the dispute resolution process created
by the UDRP has been utilized heavily, largely due to its inexpensive and expeditious
nature as compared to federal litigation. Typical fees associated with a UDRP case
range from $1,500 for the simplest cases to as much as $6,000 for cases that involve
multiple domain names and multiple panelists.106 Most proceedings take as little as
sixty days from the time the resolution provider receives the complaint.107 As of
March 1, 2010, all UDRP documents submitted by the parties to the dispute must be
filed electronically, further streamlining resolution of UDRP proceedings and
reducing costs.108
One of the general criticisms leveled at the UDRP is that it is arguably biased
toward complainants. One WIPO report noted that in 2008, 85% of its decisions
favored the complainant and only 15% favored the domain registration holder. These
figures are partially attributable to the substantial number of domain name
registrants who do not respond to the complaint of the trademark owner, either
because they choose not to, or because the complaint never reaches them. A
102UDRP, supra note 97,
4(a).
10s Id.
4(b).
101Id.
105 See A Nattermann & Cie GmbH v. Watson Pharm. Inc., WIPO Case No. D2010-0800 (Aug.

31, 20 10).

106 See
Schedule of Fees Under the
UDRP, WORLD
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/fees (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).

INTELL.

107Guide to the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, WORLD

B(2), http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/guide/

(last visited Oct. 16, 2011).

PROP.

ORG.,

INTELL. PROP. ORG.,

108 See Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, INTERNET CORP. FOR
ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, http://www.icann.org/en/dlndlr/udlrp/uniform-rules.htm (last visited
Oct. 16, 2011).
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substantial portion of those registrants who choose not to respond to the complaint
may do so because they cannot afford the costs associated with drafting a response to
a UDRP complaint, in contrast to their sometimes better-funded opponents.
Further, the UDRP lacks the broad safe harbor provisions that are present in
the ACPA. Fair use is mentioned only once among the provisions of the UDRP as a
potential example of a manner in which a Respondent may demonstrate that it has a
legitimate interest in the domain name. Specifically, a Respondent can buttress its
claim of rights to the domain name by demonstrating that it is "making a legitimate
noncommercial or fair use of the domain name, without intent for commercial gain to
misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at
issue."o
In any event, although UDRP proceedings are rapid and arguably biased toward
complainants, the sole remedy that they provide is one of cancellation or transfer of
the domain name in question. Further, these decisions have been held appealable in
U.S. federal courts.110 These considerations serve to potentially mitigate the impact
of UDRP decisions.

IV. ADJUDICATORY INCONSISTENCIES IN DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES
The ACPA and UDRP have become the preferred instruments for adjudicating
cybersquatting disputes and they have been generally effective in doing so. However,
these legislative frameworks were narrowly drafted to address just that:
cybersquatting. They were never intended to serve as tools for regulating the
broader realm of domain name disputes as a whole,"' a realm that includes, among
other things, the use of domain names in association with Internet gripe sites. The
legislative history is clear on this point, both nationally and internationally: the
central purpose of the ACPA, according to Congress, was to combat "the practice of
cybersquatters who register numerous domain names containing American
trademarks or trade names only to hold them ransom in exchange for money."112
Further, the ACPA was created "to provide clarity in the law for trademark owners
by prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive marks as Internet
domain names with the intent to profit from the goodwill associated with such
marks. . . ."113
The provisions of the UDRP point to a similar goal:
the
aforementioned bad faith indicators delineated in the Policy are clearly targeted to
curtail cybersquatting.114
In UDRP proceedings, one factor that serves to frustrate the consistency of panel
decisions is the international nature of these proceedings. UDRP proceedings are
decided "on the basis of the statements and documents submitted and in accordance
with the Policy, [ICANN's] Rules and any rules and principles of law that [a panel]
109UDRP, supra note 97, 1 4(c)(iii).
110See Sallen v. Corinthians Licenciamentos LTDA, 273 F.3d 14, 24-30 (1st Cir. 2001).
"I See Lipton, supra note 11, at 448-49 (explaining that the narrow tailoring of the ACPA and
the UDRP are likely attributable, at least in part, to the hesitation of lawmakers to overreach their
jurisdictional authority in the domain space).
112H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 6 (1999).
"s S. REP. NO. 106-140, at 4 (1999).
"04 See UDRP, supra note 97,
4(b)(i)-(iii).
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deems applicable."115 Because UDRP proceedings are international, the principles of
law that are applied vary from proceeding to proceeding, sometimes resulting in
disparate decisions. This is particularly relevant to issues concerning free speech:
while most nations recognize free speech, the degree to which it is upheld in reality
differs substantially from nation to nation. Thus, in UDRP proceedings in which free
speech is raised as a defense, the defense is given varying amounts of deference.
WIPO is aware of this distinction, noting that "[i]n the event that a domain name
identical or confusingly similar to a trademark is being used for a genuine
noncommercial free speech website, there are two main views."" 6 The view adopted
by the majority of panelists in disputes between U.S. parties is generally highly
protective of speech: "irrespective of whether the domain name as such connotes
criticism, the respondent has a legitimate interest in using the trademark as part of
the domain name of a criticism site if such use is fair and noncommercial."1"7 In
decisions that involve panelists and parties of other nations, precedent is decidedly
the opposite; such panels give far less credence to the right to criticize.
In a very direct sense, then, domain name disputes may be treated
inconsistently when free speech is at issue, due to a sort of cultural bias. However,
free speech is also treated disparately with respect to the interpretation of the
existing statutory constructs. Cybergriping and cybersquatting cases often form a
nexus that is difficult to divide and the more difficult cases fall close to the line. Most
prominent among these are the disputes in which questions arise regarding
consumer confusion, bad faith and fair use. Specifically, tribunals have struggled to
scrutinize:
(1) the registrant's underlying motives, divorced from its otherwise
facially legitimate attempt to utilize a domain name as a vehicle for protected critical
speech; and (2) the registrant's success in conveying the intended commentary, as
opposed to merely generating confusion among consumers.
The two are often
inexorably intertwined, as bad faith is frequently presumed when a cybergriper's
efforts lead to a likelihood of confusion among consumers.

A. Conflicts Regarding Consumer Confusion

1. Overview
On the Internet, a website may be located via two primary methods: type-in
search, or the use of a search engine. Historically, users have relied largely on typein search,11 8 which is the act of literally typing a domain name into the address box of
a browser, a sort of guessing game in which a user not already aware of the URL
associated with a specific website experimentally enters a domain name in a browser

for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, supra note 108, 15.
of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, WORLD INTELL. PROP.

"15 Rules
116 Overview

http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/search/overview

ORG.,

(last visited Oct. 16, 2011).

"17Id.
118 See Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (24 Cir. 2000) (stating
"[for consumers to buy things or gather information on the Internet, they need an easy way to find

particular companies or brand names. The most common method of locating an unknown domain
name is simply to type in the company name or logo with the suffix .com").
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address box. For example, a user might enter <walmart.com> into a browser address
box, guessing (correctly) that this is the address at which Wal-Mart's website can be
found. In light of this, companies have a strong preference for the acquisition and
use of domain names comprised of their own trademarks." 9
Cybergripers have availed themselves of the practice of type-in search by
registering domain names that are confusingly similar or identical to their targets'
trademarks.
In this manner, cybergripers cast a wider net by garnering the
attention of those who set out to locate information provided by the trademark
owner, rather than information critical of the trademark owner. It might be said
that this is the digital equivalent of disgruntled consumers picketing in front of a
merchant's place of business: the disgruntled party places itself in a position where
it will be most visible to the relevant public, that is, to those who would avail
themselves of the establishment's goods and services. Likewise, the picketer may
carry a sign broadly displaying the trademark of the establishment owner, in
connection with a message about the establishment's complained-about practices.
Moving closer to the New Domainia analogy, the issue is not whether the
picketer may complain about the merchant's practices, but rather who has the right
to make use of the property where the picketer stands. The merchant would argue
that the property is a natural extension of its own territory and the picketer's
presence there is illegal. The picketer would respond that it has as much right to use
the property as anyone, and indeed, it is the most effective location for its protest.
The majority of gripe site decisions arise from disputes in which the cybergriper
has registered a domain name that incorporates a close approximation of its target's
trademark. Critical content hosted at incorporative domain names almost certainly
raises the ire of trademark owners more quickly than identical content located on
websites that do not employ the target's trademark within the associated domain
name, even when the trademark owner's mark is used liberally in the content of the
site.
If cybergripers chose to post their criticism solely at informal consumer
complaint clearinghouse sites like <www.ripoffreport.com> and at consumer review
sites like <consumerreports.org>, rather than at gripe sites hosted at incorporative
domains, there would almost certainly be less litigation surrounding them. For
example, critical comments about the big box home improvement store Home Depot
appear on the website <www.ripoffreport.com>. Although the comments on this site
make liberal use of the HOME DEPOT trademark, Home Depot is probably less
likely to pursue action against the site's owner or its contributors than it would if
similar content was posted on sites hosted at incorporative domains like
<homedep otsucks.com> or <home dep otopinions.com>. 120 Both incorporative domain
gripe sites and non-incorporative domain gripe sites use the same trademarks in the
content of their sites and both sites exist for the same purpose: to express critical
speech concerning the trademark owner. In both cases, the trademark owner could
119See id.;H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 5 (1999).
120Indeed, Home Depot pursued action against

the registrants of both of these domain names.
Homer TLC, Inc. v. GreenPeople, NAF Claim No. FA0508000550345 (Oct. 25, 2005) (denying
transfer of the domain name because 'Respondent's use of the <homedepotsucks.com> domain name
as a protest site is a legitimate noncommercial or fair use"); Homer TLC, Inc. v. Unitedleurope
Consulting, NAF Claim No. FAO711001110103 (Feb. 8, 2008) (ordering transfer of the domain name
<homedlepotopinionscom> because Respondent was using the domain solely for monetization).
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theoretically pursue a remedy under libel law, if the veracity of the comments was
questionable.
There are several possible explanations for this disparity. In part, this may be
attributable to the fact that both the ACPA and UDRP have provided streamlined
litigation for domain name disputes. Consequently, plaintiffs may simply view gripe
sites hosted at incorporative domains as easier targets than those hosted at nonincorporative domains, which would not be within the reach of the ACPA or UDRP.
The disparity may also stem from the dual use of the trademark in both the domain
name and in the content of the gripe site, which may be particularly offensive to
trademark owners. The most plausible explanation, however, is that trademark
owners recognize that domain names have proven to be valuable search tools for
locating content on the Internet. Hence, the goal of the trademark owner is to use
domain names to push an uninterrupted stream of traffic to its commercial website.
When a third party interrupts this stream, the potential detriment to the trademark
owner is very high.
In this sense, confusion is not the issue, but rather diversion. There is a subtle
distinction. A trademark owner that pursues legal action against the owner of a
<trademark-sucks.com> domain name, for example, is not likely to fear that the
domain name will generate genuine confusion as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation.
Rather, the trademark owner is more likely concerned that Internet users who
employ search engines to locate a trademark owner's website will be provided with a
list of results, among them links to unaffiliated websites, including gripe sites. Such
users may be diverted to competing commercial content, in the case of
cybersquatters, or to noncommercial content that is critical of the trademark owner,
posted by cybergripers.
Legitimate cybergripers have historically chosen incorporative domains for this
very reason: they provide assurance that their critical speech will reach a wider
audience by creating a greater likelihood that such sites will be more easily
discovered by Internet users who seek information about the targeted entities.
Buttressing site content that makes fair use of an entity's trademark with the use of
that mark within an incorporative domain name will increase the likelihood that
both interested and incidental viewers of the speech will find it. However, trademark
owners are more likely to regard this as an attempt to sow confusion and they often
object to this approach as an encroachment of their exclusive rights in the use of
their trademarks.121
J. Thomas McCarthy, one of the leading authorities on
trademark law, firmly supports this view:
gripe sites that use the target's trademark in the domain name either
identically or in a confusingly similar format violate mainstream trademark
121See, e.g., Cabela's Inc. v. Cupcake Patrol, NAF Claim No. FA0006000095080 (Aug. 29,

2000).
[bly using Complainant's marks in its domain names, Respondent makes it likely
that Internet users entering 'Cabelais' into a search engine will find
'CABELASSUCKS.COM' in addition to the Complainant's site <cabelascom>.
Respondent's domain name is sufficiently similar to Complainants marks that the
search engine results will confusingly list the Respondents domain name when
searching for Complainant's mark.
Id.
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policies. Such sites should not be immunized by free speech principles.
Such Web sites rely on confusion to intercept the potential viewers of
plaintiffs Web site and expose them to the message disseminated at the site
identified by the accused domain name. Such Web sites rely on confusion
caused by the domain name to convey their message, thereby negating any
free speech defense.1 22
However, this approach does not account for the numerous legal actions taken
against incorporative domains of the <trademark-sucks.com> variety, because
<trademark-sucks.com> domain names do not use domain names in an identical or
confusingly similar manner. McCarthy has asserted as much:
Based on the principle that trademark law cannot be used to suppress
criticism of a company or product, it is not appropriate to use trademark
law as a weapon against criticism of a company on the Internet, as with the
use of the "yourcompanysucks" type of domain name for consumer Web sites
devoted to criticizing the acts and policies of 'Your Company."123
Further, there is a school of thought that is founded upon the broader belief that
trademark owners' exclusive rights are narrowly proscribed and do not provide an
absolute monopoly in the use of those marks that extends to domain names:
nothing in trademark law requires that title to domain names that
incorporate trademarks or portions of trademarks be provided to trademark
holders. To hold otherwise would create an immediate and indefinite
monopoly to all famous mark holders on the Internet, by which they could
lay claim to all .com domain names which are arguably 'the same' as their
mark ..... Trademark law does not support such a monopoly.124
Whether such use constitutes the kind of confusion that is proscribed by
trademark law depends, in part, upon one's view of the justification for trademark
law. A consumer-centric approach suggests that trademark law should protect
consumers from confusion and deception by providing reliable indicators of the source
of goods and services in the marketplace. The use of the term "marketplace" may be
significant here:
it might be said that consumers should be protected from
uncertainty created by competitors, rather than by speech advocates, who do not
participate in the marketplace. Gripe sites, then, might be excused for causing
momentary confusion, if that confusion leads consumers only to non-commercial
122 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 38, § 25:76; Planned Parenthood Fed. of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1430, 1441 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) affd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that
defendant's admitted purpose was to divert potential viewers of plaintiffs website and expose them
his own contrary message); Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 291 (D.N.J. 1998) aff'd,
159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting defendant that he hoped to divert Internet users from
plaintiffs religious message "before they have a chance to see the obscene garbage on [plaintiffs]
site").
123 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 38, § 3 1:148.
124Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. Supp. 2d 372, 380 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (internal citations
omitted).
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commentary sites that are intended to convey free speech, rather than to sites
promoting competing goods or services.
In contrast, a trademark owner-centric approach might suggest that trademark
law should protect the producers of goods and services from the misappropriation of
the goodwill that they have worked to create. Many definitions of goodwill in the
context of trademark law have emerged over the years,125 among them the broad
view that goodwill is the "public confidence in the quality of the product and in the
warranties made on behalf of the product, and the 'name recognition' of the product
by the public that differentiates that product from others."126 The ability of a gripe
site to diminish name recognition is probably low, particularly when used in a purely
noncommercial sense; however, gripe sites do possess the capacity to reduce public
confidence in the quality of a trademark owner's products and services. In this sense,
it might be argued that the unauthorized use of another's mark in a gripe site
domain name in a confusing manner might be said to offend the goals of trademark
law.
In any event, the United States Supreme Court has left little doubt that some
possibility of consumer confusion regarding the origin of goods or services may be
nevertheless compatible with the unauthorized use of another's trademark, noting
that "[t]he common law's tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on the part of
consumers

followed from . . . the undesirability

of allowing

anyone to obtain a

complete monopoly on use of a descriptive term simply by grabbing it first."127 In
holding that a "mere risk of confusion will not rule out fair use,"128 the Supreme
Court placed the burden on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the risk of consumer
confusion is great enough to outweigh its fair use.
The Internet provides enormous freedom for speakers to be heard, but in one
sense, it is a victim of its own accessibility: it is essentially unlimited in both size
and scope. Consequently, the challenge of standing out and being heard among the
din is a trying endeavor. Those Internet users who seek out expressive speech of a
particular nature on the Internet will almost surely find it, but those who do not are
unlikely to encounter it, unless the speaker engages in some means to reach its
target audience. Just as a speaker on a soapbox strives to reach both interested and
initially disinterested listeners, so must a cybergriper attempt to reach an audience
greater than those who seek out its advocacy. The use of incorporative domain
names is one way to achieve this purpose, with varying degrees of confusion
resulting.

2. Confusion in <trade-sucks.com>Disputes
Domain name disputes concerned with <trademark-sucks.com> domain names
present a particular area of uncertainty in regard to confusion. Logic would suggest
that most consumers are unlikely to be confused into thinking that a website located
at <walmart sucks.com> is in any way affiliated with or endorsed by the retail giant.
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 38, §§ 2:17-20.
126Premier Dental Prods. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d1 850, 860 (3d Cir. 1986).
127KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121-22 (2004).
128Id.
125 See
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While most U.S. federal courts have rejected the assertion that such domain names
create confusion,129 UDRP panels have been largely divided as to whether the
addition of a pejorative term or phrase to a trademark will dispel the likelihood of
confusion.
It has been suggested that the majority of UDRP panels favor the finding that
such domain names are confusingly similar. 30 For example, with one member
dissenting, a WIPO panel held that the <airfrancesucks.com> domain name was
confusingly similar to the trademark AIR FRANCE, rationalizing that not all
international consumers would recognize the pejorative nature of the term "sucks."13 1
Another WIPO panel found that <redbullsucks.com> was confusingly similar to the
trademark RED BULL, asserting that "sucks" is merely a generic addition to the
distinctive mark.132 Other panels have concluded that <alamo-sucks.com> was
confusingly similar to ALAMO 3 3 , <stopandshopsucks.com> was confusingly similar
to STOP & SHOP,134 and <michaelbloombergsucks.com> was confusingly similar to

MICHAEL BLOOMBERG.' 3 5

Numerous UDRP panels have also supported the contrary premise, finding no
confusing similarity in analogous cases.136 One panel has suggested that the trend
among UDRP panelists is shifting in this direction.13 7

129Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1165 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(noting in dicta that a reasonable user would not believe that Bally sponsored a website located at

<Ballysucks.com>); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(commenting that "the average consumer would not confuse lucentsucks.com with a web site
sponsored by plaintiff [Lucent Technologies]"); Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 778 (6th Cir.
2003) (finding "no possibility of confusion" between Taubman and <taubmansucks.com> because
inclusion of the term "sucks" removed any confusion as to the source); Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v.
Benfield, 507 F. Supp. 2d 832, 846 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (stating that "[n]o one seeking Taylor's website
would think-even momentarily-that Taylor in fact sponsored a website that included the word 'ripoff
in its website address").
130See Wachovia Corp. v. Alton Flanders, WIPO Case No. D2003-0596 (Sept. 19, 2003)
(discussing the split among panels).
131Societ6 Air France v. Virtual Dates, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2005-0168 (May 24, 2005).
132Red Bull GmbH v. Carl Gamel, WIPO Case No. D2008-0253 (Apr. 14, 2008).
133Vanguard Trademark Holdings USA, L.L.C. v. European Travel Network, WIPO Case No.
D2008-1325 (Oct. 31, 2008).
134 The Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Ian Anderson, NAF Claim No. FA0211000133637
(Jan. 8, 2003).
35
Bloomberg L.P. v. Secaucus Grp, NAF Claim No. FA0104000097077 (June 7, 2001)
(deciding that the marks are confusingly similar, but declining to transfer the domain name
<michaelbloombergsucks.com> on other grounds).
136 See, e.g., Asda Grp Ltd. v. Mr. Paul Kilgour, WIPO Case No. D2002-0857 (Nov. 11, 2002)
(declining to find the domain names confusingly similar and noting "by now the number of Internet
users who do not appreciate the significance of the '-sucks' suffix must be so small as to be de
minimis and not worthy of consideration"); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Parisi, WIPO Case No. D20001015 (Jan. 26, 2001) (finding that a domain name combining a trademark with the pejorative
"sucks" or similar language clearly indicates that the domain name is not affiliated with the
trademark owner); Morgan Stanley and Morgan Stanley Smith Barney Holdings L.L.C. v.
EnviroCitizen, L.L.C., NAF Claim No. FA1008001342402 (Nov. 26, 2010) (holding that the addition
of the pejorative 'screwed by" to the domain names in question eliminated any possibility of
confusion); Jenny Solursh v. Am. European Mktg., NAF Claim No. FA0612000864749 (Jan. 15,
2007) (holding that Respondent's <jennysolurshsucks.com> domain name was not confusingly
similar to Complainant's JENNY SOLURSH mark).
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The disparity between the U.S. federal courts that hold consistently against a
finding of confusion and those UDRP panels that hold otherwise is likely
attributable, in part, to the differing standards applied by these tribunals. Federal
courts applying traditional Lanham Act principles are likely to require a higher
standard of confusion than panels that apply the UDRP requirement of "confusing
similarity." As one WIPO panel suggested, "the standard for finding confusingly
similarity under the first element of the Policy, which is a rule specifically designed
to address cybersquatting, is not the same standard as for finding trademark
infringement."13 8
Even federal courts applying the arguably lower threshold
"confusingly similar" standard demanded by the ACPA may be persuaded to adopt an
approach to confusion that is more reminiscent of the traditional Lanham Act
likelihood of confusion standard.
However, the disparity among UDRP panelists is more troubling. Absent a
bright line rule, there is little to guidance for registrants, trademark owners, or the
judicial bodies that decide such disputes. This places trademark owners and speech
activists in an uncertain position with respect to the boundaries of permissible
registration of such domain names.
In particular, this uncertainty presents
challenges to speech activists who might select <trademark-sucks.com> domain
names as a good faith means of avoiding trademark misuse.

3. Initial Interest Confusion and Parody
In domain name disputes, the traditional notion of confusion does not always fit
well. In particular, when a legitimate gripe site is encountered by an Internet user,
any confusion with the trademark target holder is likely ephemeral, because the user
will soon realize that it has chanced upon a site that is critical of the trademark
owner.
Consequently, courts have been more preoccupied with initial interest
confusion. In the context of domain name disputes, initial interest confusion derives
from the unauthorized use of a trademark within a domain name to divert Internet
traffic to the domain name holder's own site, thereby capitalizing on the trademark
owner's goodwill.13 9 In such cases, although the user's initial confusion is dispelled
upon viewing the website, the confusion that causes the momentary diversion may be
adequate to meet or support a finding of confusion.
The majority of federal circuits have adopted the initial interest confusion
doctrine, some explicitly, others only implicitly.140 Most federal courts require that a
claim of initial interest confusion be accompanied by evidence of actual commercial
use, i.e., the domain name registrant is using its website to generate revenue. Where
such use is absent, most courts have found no liability under the doctrine.141 In
137 FMR Corp. v. Native Am. Warrior Soc'y, Lamar Sneed, Lamar Sneedle, WIPO Case No.
D2004-0978 (Jan. 20, 2005).
138 Societ6 Air France v. Virtual Dates, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2005-0 168 (May 24, 2005).
139 Austi. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield , 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006).
140See Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L.REV. 105, 108-09 (2005).
141See, e.g., Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v.Kremer, 403 F.3d1 672, 683 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating
"[blecause we hold that Kremer's use of Bosley's mark was noncommercial, we do not reach the issue
of initial interest confusion"); Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 507 F. Supp. 24 832, 846 (S.D.
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contrast, when one business makes use of another's trademark specifically for its own
financial gain in this manner, courts that have adopted the initial interest confusion
doctrine have uniformly imposed liability.142 UDRP panels have reached similar
conclusions, recognizing the initial interest confusion doctrine and finding that such
confusion may be adequate to meet the "identical or confusingly similar" prong set
forth in the Policy, provided the associated website is being used commercially.143
Most tribunals that recognize the doctrine will not hold legitimate cybergripers
liable, since commercial use is not the purpose of their websites. However, initial
interest confusion has been the basis for liability in some gripe site cases in which a
commercial element was a small or incidental part of a site otherwise used to criticize
others. For example, a New York district court held that a gripe site created
actionable initial interest confusion, despite a disclaimer of affiliation posted
prominently on the website.144 In doing so, the district court determined that the
cybergriper's site was commercial for three reasons: first, the site contained a single
link to the cybergriper's own business website; second, the international nature of the
internet was itself a kind of "use in commerce and thus commercial in nature; and
finally, the cybergriper's use of the trademark owner's mark inhibited the plaintiff
from itself using the mark, a kind of competitive commercial use.145
Initial interest confusion has also been found in some cases of pure cybergriping.
In one such UDRP proceeding, a panel held that a purely critical, noncommercial
website hosted at the trademark-identical domain name <dellorusso.info> was
sufficient to cause initial interest confusion.146 In so holding, the panel reasoning
noted:
"this reasoning in no way abridges Respondent's freedom to criticize
Complainant. She is merely prevented from broadcasting her criticism from
Complainant's soapbox, taking advantage of Complainant's mark to reach her
intended audience."147
Several tribunals have reached determinations concerning free speech and
trademark infringement in this context by divorcing the domain name at issue from
the content of its associated website. Under this approach, if the domain name itself
does not possess an expressive component, then it serves to create initial interest
confusion, rather than expression, regardless of the content of the associated website.

Ohio 2007) (denying plaintiffs claim for initial interest confusion because the cybergriper's "site did
not sell products or services or direct consumers to other vendors"); Savannah Coll. of Art & Design,
Inc. v. Houeix, 369 F. Supp. 2d 929, 954 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2004) (explaining that gripe site did not
create initial interest confusion because it did not meet the "purpose underlying the initial interest
confusion doctrine: preventing competitors of a trademark holder from gaining an unfair financial
or commercial advantage by luring unsuspecting users to their websites through use of the
trademark").
142See PACAAR Inc. v. Telescan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 253 (6th Cir. 2003); Promatek
Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002); Brookfield Comms., Inc. v. West
Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 1999).
14 See AltaVista Co. v. AltaVisa, NAF Claim No. FA0008000095480 (Oct. 31, 2000); Rockwell
Automation, Inc. v. Jose Hernandez, NAF Claim No. FA1004001316859 (May 20, 2010); BroanNutone, L.L.C. v. Ready Set Sales, WIPO Case No. D2010-0920 (July 27, 2010).
144 OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 191 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
'4 5Id. at 185-86.
146
Joseph Dello Russo M.D. v. Michelle Guillaumin, WIPO Case No. D2006-1627 (Apr. 27,
2007).
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One such UDRP panel held that "[b]ecause Respondent's use of Complainant's mark
in a domain name is not part of a communicative message, his use of Complainant's
mark is not protected by the First Amendment."148 Hence, "[w]hile the content of
Respondent's website may enjoy First Amendment and fair use protection, those
protections do not equate to rights or a legitimate interest with respect to a domain
name which is confusingly similar to another's trademark."149
Defendant registrants have sometimes sought to characterize their
unauthorized use of another's trademark in a trademark-identical domain name as a
form of parody, a carefully-guarded form of First Amendment speech that is wellrecognized in American jurisprudence. However, the use of parody as a tool for
commentary on the Internet has occasionally backfired. With respect to domain
name disputes, this effect is tied to the fact that the legal criteria for a successful
parody are narrow and well-established and the failure to adequately meet those
criteria in the context of a parody-gripe site may sometimes provide a judicial
shortcut to finding fault with the parody site. It has been held that for a parody to
succeed, it must convey two contradictory messages simultaneously: it must suggest
that it is the original-that is, the target of the parody-and it must at the same time
suggest that it is poking fun at the original. 150 When it succeeds largely in
accomplishing only the former, it fails as a parody and it is vulnerable to trademark
law.151 As Justice Souter has noted, "[t]he threshold question when fair use is raised
in defense of parody is whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived."1 52
In one celebrated and highly-controversial opinion by the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals, the Court enjoined a cybergriper from the use of <peta.org>.153 The
parody-gripe site hosted at this domain name featured information about "People
Eating Tasty Animals," rather than the animal rights activism that is associated
with the well-known organization People for the Ethical Treatement of Animals
("PETA"). Although the content of the site was clearly a parody, apparent to
essentially anyone who viewed it, the Court looked solely at the domain name itself
and arrived at the conclusion that <peta.org> did not convey a successful parody.
The Fourth Circuit did not explicitly describe its analysis as one that was grounded
in initial interest confusion, but its analysis was consistent with the doctrine.
In a later decision, seemingly at odds with the PETA decision, the Fourth
Circuit declined to enjoin a cybergriper's use of the domain name <fallwell.com>,
which was an intentional misspelling of Reverend Jerry Falwell's name and website
<falwell.com>.1 54 In that case, the content hosted at the gripe site was not veiled in
irony or parody as the content at <peta.org> had been; rather it was a more explicit
criticism of Falwell's religious views. Although the domain name was essentially
identical to the trademark, the Court looked beyond the domain name to the content
of the associated website and found no offense. The Fourth Circuit recognized the
14 8Annette A. Antoun d/bla The Paxton Herald v. Stephen Millard,
FAO207000 114770 (Aug.21, 2002).

NAF Claim No.

Id.
150Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Grp, Inc., 886 F.2d1 490, 494 (24 Cir. 1989).
119

151
Id. at 494 (stating "a poor parody [is] vulnerable under trademark law.").
152Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994).
15s People for Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 362 (4th Cir. 2001)
[hereinafter PETA].
154
Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 311 (4th Cir. 2005).
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apparent disparity between its decisions, but it suggested that its earlier "inquiry in
PETA was limited to whether [the registrant's] use of the domain name
"www.peta.org" constituted a successful enough parody."155 In permitting the
registrant's use of <fallwell.com> for its gripe site, the Fourth Circuit recognized the
importance of reviewing the underlying site content in matters of alleged
infringement, noting that "it has long been established that even when alleged
infringers use the very marks at issue in titles, courts look to the underlying content
to determine whether the titles create a likelihood of confusion as to source."' 56
These seemingly disparate decisions suggest that tribunals have met with
difficulty in adapting existing statutory constructs to domain name disputes and they
will sometimes avail themselves of the most convenient legal standard to reach the
desired remedy. Had the registrant of <peta.org> avoided the use of a well-accepted
form of criticism (parody), the Fourth Circuit might have been compelled to rely upon
a different argument, or hold in the registrant's favor. Likewise, had Reverend
Falwell's detractor chosen parody rather than express criticism, the Court might
have availed itself of this escape valve to reach a contrary decision. Other courts
have similarly relied upon the failed parody of domain names divorced from their
associated site content as a justification to enjoin their use.157
The initial interest confusion doctrine is a poor fit in domain name disputes as a
whole and in particular, it is poorly adapted to gripe site disputes. The adoption of
the doctrine in the cyber realm serves to create uncertainty for registrants,
trademark owners, and ultimately the public. Within the World Wide Web, the
elimination of initial interest confusion is almost immediate. As one UDRP panel
opined:
any such confusion would, in the view of the majority of the Panel
immediately be dispelled by the content on the Respondent's website.
Second, and in any event, such a low level of confusion is, in the view of the
majority of the Panel, a price worth paying to preserve the free exchange of
ideas via the Internet. A user who stumbles upon the Respondent's site
while looking for the Complainant's official site need only click the "back"
button to return to his or her search.15 8
This argument is compelling. Even juxtaposed with a trademark-centric view,
the justifications for extending trademark protection to domain names without
consideration of the associated website content may be unnecessarily harsh, as users
of the Internet are not so easily fooled:

155Id. at 316.
156Id. at 322.
15 See, e.g., Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d 424, 429 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (stating
"[i]ooking at defendants' domain names alone, there is no suggestion of a parody"); Christian Dior
Couture v. Christina Dior/Chris Vella, WIPO Case No. D2009-0032 (Feb. 27, 2009) (stating "[t]his
Panel is of the view that where the parodical domain name does not sufficiently differentiate itself
from the mark that it parodies .. ,. then the fact that a parody may be intended does not provide a
right or legitimate interest for the purposes of the Policy").
158 Legal & Gen. Grp. Plc v. Image Plus, WIPO Case No. D2002-1019 (Dec. 30, 2002).
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It is clear that Internet surfers are inured to the false starts and excursions
awaiting them and are unlikely to be dissuaded, or unnerved when, after
taking a stab at what they think is the most likely domain name for a
particular web site guess wrong and bring up another's webpage [and
further] nothing in trademark law requires that title to domain names that
incorporate trademarks or portions of trademarks be provided to trademark
holders.159

Only the view that trademark rights grant absolute monopoly rights in words
and symbols could substantiate the application of the initial interest confusion
doctrine in domain name disputes, and this view is not consistent with U.S.
trademark law.' 6 0 The scope of legal protection for trademarks is limited to those
instances where there is a genuine likelihood of confusion.11
In practice, the misdirection that a user experiences on the Internet when the
user types in a domain name and finds something other than what was expected is
not unusual. For example, a user may type <delta.com> into a browser address box,
expecting to find a website about bathroom fixtures, but instead the user is directed
to the website of a major airline. In such instances, there is momentary confusion
that is immediately cleared up upon viewing the site content. Relying upon initial
interest confusion as a means to satisfy the confusion requirement and/or the bad
faith requirements of the Lanham Act, the ACPA, or the UDRP is contrary to the
framework of established trademark law policy that prohibits such a monopoly on
language.
Further, "where companies 'are non-competitors, initial interest confusion does
not have the same consequence, because there is no substituted product to buy from
the junior user, and the senior user does not bear the prospect of harm."1 62 This view
is particularly compelling in the case of gripe sites that provide no competitive
commercial offerings.

B. Conflicts Regarding Fair Use
The fair use defense should provide immunity from liability for trademark
misuse to essentially all genuine noncommercial gripe sites. After all, fair use is
provided as a defense in the traditional provisions of the Lanham Act' 6 3 as well as in
the ACPA.16 4 Fair use was clearly on the minds of the legislature in drafting
anticybersquatting legislation, as it is mentioned in two separate provisions of the
ACPA: in the explicit savings clause and also as one of the enumerated factors that
Strick Corp. v. Strickland, 162 F. Supp. 24 372, 377-80 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
See Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 24 117, 133 (D. Mass. 1999) (stating
"[hioldiers of a famous mark are not automatically entitled to use that mark as their domain name;
trademark law does not support such a monopoly") aff'd, 232 F.3d1 1 (1st Cir. 2000); accord Chatam
Int'l, Inc. v.Bodum, Inc., 157 F.Supp. 24 549, 561 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
161 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 38, § 2:10.
162Chatam, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 558 (citing Checkpoint Sys., 104 F. Supp. 24 427, 462 (D.N.J.
2000).
163 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4)(2006).
16415 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)-(ii).
15

1oo
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can serve to refute a showing of bad faith.165 Further, the legislative history
indicates that the ACPA does not apply to any noncommercial uses of a trademark,
including commentary, comparative advertising, criticism, parody, or news
reporting.' 66 Fair use is also given deference in the UDRP, where it serves as
evidence that a registrant has legitimate rights to a domain name under the
Policy. 167

In addition, the Supreme Court's pronouncement in KP Permanent Make- Up
leaves little doubt that the latitude afforded the fair use defense under U.S. law is
substantial.16 8 This would seem to suggest that there is little room for disagreement
as to the legitimacy of gripe site domain names as a fair use of trademarks, provided
that the associated websites do not violate other mainstream trademark policies,
such as commercial use. However, there are two primary inconsistencies in the
treatment of fair use among tribunals that reach determinations in gripe site cases:
(1) the disagreement among the federal circuits over the appropriate standard, if any,
for the nominative fair use defense; and (2) the treatment of fair use in the content of
a gripe site as compared to within the domain name itself, especially by UDRP
panels.
As noted previously, fair use in the domain name context may either be classic
(descriptive) fair use, or nominative fair use.169 In the context of gripe site domain
names, fair use is more likely of the nominative variety, since gripe sites typically
make unauthorized use of trademarks to refer to the trademark owner itself.
Otherwise stated, the permissible use of another's trademark to identify, criticize, or
compare the trademark owner itself is generally a necessary component of such sites.
Where a domain name is being used to express speech directly, e.g., <walmartsucks.com>, or to steer users to protected speech located on a website, nominative
fair use would seem to provide a reasonable defense to claims of trademark misuse.
However, in the United States, the nominative fair use defense is largely
exclusive to the Ninth and Third Circuits.170 Other federal courts have been less
willing to embrace this defense and some have expressly declined to adopt it.171 The
nominative fair use defense was first enunciated by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in a non-cyberlaw context,172 but that court has recently extended the

165Id.

S. REP. No. 106-140, at 14 (1999); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV).
1 UDRP, supra note 97, 1 4(c).
168 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121-22 (2004).
169Notably, following the United States Supreme Court's decision in KP Permanent Make-Up,
the distinctions between nominative fair use and classic fair use may be less certain. See William
McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 84-88 (2008) (analyzing how the
tests for nominative and classic fair use, in light of the KP Permanent decision, are so similar that it
is difficult to determine which test to apply to a given fact pattern).
170 For a review of the circuit split on the issue of nominative fair use, see 4 MCCARTHY, supra
note 38, § 23:11.
'oo

Id.
172See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d1 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992
'7'

(holding that a commercial user is entitled to a nominative fair use defense provided he meets the
three requirements set by the court).
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doctrine to apply to domain names as well.173 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit not only
expressly refused to apply the defense; it did so in the context of a domain name
dispute.1 74 This inconsistency creates uncertainty in the sense that the use of
domain names to express speech on the Internet is regulated by varying
jurisdictional views. Hence, despite the global reach of the Internet, the availability
of the defense will vary from circuit to circuit.
Several UDRP panels have also recognized nominative fair use. Among them,
some have permitted the defense only when expressive speech is recognizable in the
domain name itself, as in <nuvaringsideeffects.com>, in which a panel declined to
transfer the domain name to the owner of the NUVA RING trademark because
speech was inherent in the domain name.175 Other panels have extended the
doctrine and found nominative fair use even when the gripe site domain name is
identical to the Complainant's trademark. 76 Still other panels have recognized
nominative fair use only to the extent that it is a component of the content of the
gripe site, but not when it is used in the domain name itself.177 In one such

17 See, e.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2010)
(holding that defendant automobile broker's use of plaintiffs LEXUS trademark in their domain
names was nominative fair use).
174 See e.g., PACCAR v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003). The court
stated that:
nominative fair use is a defense allowed by the Ninth Circuit in cases where the
defendant uses a trademark to describe the plaintiffs product rather than its
own ... [but] . . . [t]his circuit has never followed the nominative fair use analysis,
always having applied the Frische's Restaurants test. We are not inclined to
adopt the Ninth Circuit's analysis here.
Id.
175 N.V. Organon and Schering Plough Corp. v. Fields Law Firm and Stephen Fields, NAF
Claim No. FA0904001259266 (June 16, 2009). The court denied transfer noting that respondent
was:
entitled to use the name of that product in his domain name, so long as the
domain name, taken as a whole, is clear as to the purpose of the website and does
not imply sponsorship or endorsement thereof by the proponents of that product.
Id.; see Mercury Radio Arts, Inc. and Glenn Beck v. Isaac Eiland-Hall, WIPO Case No. D2009-1182
(Oct.

29.

2009)

(finding

fair

use

of

the

domain

name

<glennbeckrapedandmurderedayounggirlinl990.com> because Respondent's domain name used
Complainant's trademark "in a manner that does not use more of the mark than is necessary and
does not create confusion as to Complainant's sponsorship of Respondent's activities"); Newell
Operating Co. v. HostMonster.Com and Andrew Shalaby, WIPO Case No. D2008-1805 (Mar. 3,
2009) (declining to transfer <bernzomaticinjuries.com>, which was used in association with a gripe
site describing issues with Complainant's Bernz O-Matic products).
176 See, e.g., Tom Papania v. Fraud Expose', Mr. George Adames, and Mr. Joe Baffa aka Rocky
Scarfone, WIPO Case No. D2001-0978 (Oct. 4, 2001) (finding that use by Respondent of
Complainant's personal name as domain name was fair use when Respondent used the domain
name to comment on Complainants alleged criminal history); Frederick M. Nicholas, Administrator,
The Sam Francis Estate v. Magidson Fine Art, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0673 (Sept. 27, 2000)
(declining to transfer <samfrancis.com> to Complainant the Estate of Sam Francis because it was
being used to refer to the Respondent).
'77 Estie Lauder Inc. v. estelaudercom, estelaudernet and Jeff Hanna, WIPO Case No. D20000869 (Sept. 25, 2000).
Respondent could well have chosen to use a domain name that was not
confusingly similar to Complainant's and/or in which Complainant had no rights;
it intentionally chose not to do so .. .. Respondent's free expression rights do not
here give it a right or legitimate interest in the domain names at issue.
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proceeding, a panel held that the domain name <vivendiuniversalsucks.com> was not
a fair use of Vivendi Universal's trademark, despite the inclusion of the word "sucks"
in the domain name and the use of the mark solely for a website critical of Vivendi.
Citing an earlier panel decision, the panel noted "the right to express one's views is
not the same as the right to use another's name to identify one's self as the source of
those views."' 78 In a similar decision, a WIPO panel held "[t]here is a difference
between using a service mark such as Complainant's within the body of a
website . . . on one hand, and using Complainant's mark as a domain name, on the
other." 7 9
Finally, some panels have circumvented the question altogether by simply
resolving the remaining elements of the UDRP analysis. One panel that identified
the inconsistency, but declined to take a position, seemed to indicate that the
distinction may depend upon whether the speech is commercial or noncommercial:
Some would contend that Respondent does not need to use Complainant's
name as a domain name to present the intended message because other
alternatives are available .... Others would find this view an unwarranted
restriction on free speech over the Internet, and would allow domain names
to make a direct nominative reference to the subject of the message, just as
the title of a biography may make direct reference to its subject . . . . This is

an important and critical issue that may turn on the nature of the speech
involved, so that the result could be different depending on whether the
underlying use were commercial or noncommercial speech.

. .

.

For the

reasons discussed below, we do not need to resolve this difficult issue
here.180
In any case, the application of the UDRP in this manner is counterintuitive.
The UDRP was created to establish a framework for arbitration concerned with
disputes over the registration and use of domain names, not website content.181 In
other words, the UDRP was designed to prevent cybersquatting upon domain
names.182 Any discussion of the application of the fair use defense solely to the
content of the allegedly offending gripe site would appear to be nonsensical: the
UDRP would be unnecessary if it were relegated to what is fair and not fair within
the content of a website. But this is not the case; the UDRP, like the ACPA, was
Id.; Six Continents Hotels, Inc. v. Georgetown Inc., WIPO Case No. D2003-0214 (May 18, 2003)
(stating "[there is a difference between using a service mark such as Complainant's within the body
of a website to distinguish hotel services of Complainant and those of other hotel service providers,
on one hand, and using Complainant's mark as a domain name, on the other").
178Vivendli Universal v. Mr. Jay David Sallen and G0247.COM, INC., WIPO Case No. D20011121 (Nov. 7, 2001) (finding that Respondent had no legitimate interest in and ordering transfer of
the domain name).
179Six Continents Hotels, Inc. v. Georgetown Inc., WIPO Case No. D2003-0214 (May 18, 2003).
180Jules I. Kendall v. Donald Mayer Re skipkendall.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-0868 (Oct. 26,
2000) (declining to transfer <skipkendall.com> to Complainant because the case did not involve
cybersquatting, but rather alleged defamation and as a result, the case turned on issues outside the
mandate of the JCANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy).
181UDRP, supra note 97, f 1.
182See Summit Indus., Inc. v.Jardine Performance Exhaust Inc. WIPO Case No. D2001-1001
(Oct. 15, 2001) (stating "The UDRP isdesigned to deal with simple cases of cybersquatting").
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created to regulate the use of domain names. The provision of a fair use defense, if it
applies at all, must apply to the fair use of trademarks within domain names.
Indeed, the UDRP describes fair use as a means to show that the registrant has
"rights to and legitimate interests in the domain name" in question.183 As one panel
noted, "Paragraph 4(c)(iii) ... [of the Policy] ... expressly addresses "fair use of the
domain name' and thus envisions that an entire domain name may be used in a
nominative manner to describe a product."184
To apply the UDRP otherwise essentially eviscerates the defense: domain name
disputes are concerned with the registration and use of domain names, therefore the
defense must also be applied to domain names; otherwise it has no place in the
Policy. Panels that apply fair use inconsistently serve to muddy the waters of the
mandate of the UDRP and make uncertain the scope of free expression that is
available through the medium of domain names.

C. Conflicts Regarding Bad Faith
Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan once noted that "the application of First
Amendment law is best understood and most readily explained as a kind of motivehunting."185
Although Justice Kagan's comment was iterated in a somewhat
different context,186 a corollary holds true in the context of Internet gripe site domain
name disputes. Very often, it appears that the motive of the speaker, irrespective of
the nature or value of the speech itself, is the focus of the dispute. At first, this
seems reasonable: both the ACPA and the UDRP contain provisions indicating that
the registrant's intent is relevant to the inquiry. The ACPA explicitly lists the
registrant's bad faith intent to profit as one of the three criteria that a trademark
owner must demonstrate to succeed on its ACPA claim.1 87 Similarly, the UDRP
states that a complainant must demonstrate that the domain was registered and is
being used in bad faith.188 Among the examples listed in the UDRP, bad faith may be
found where the registrant has "intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial
gain, Internet users to [its] website or other on-line location, by creating a likelihood
of confusion with the complainant's marks . . . ."189
The drafters of these legal frameworks clearly viewed "intent" and the
corresponding good/bad faith of the registrant as integral aspects of the
cybersquatting inquiry.190 In the case of true cybersquatting, this emphasis is not
183UDRP, supra note 97,
181Giddings & Lewis

1 4(c).

L.L.C. v. Neal McKean d/b/a Machineworks, Inc. dlb/a
IMachineTools.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-1150 (Mar. 14, 2001).
185
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996).
18e Id. Justice Kagan proposed that governmental motives in limiting speech are often the real
focus of First Amendment challenges. I propose that registrant motives in registering domain
names are most commonly the real focus of the tribunals that decide gripe site disputes.
187 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
188 UDRP, supra note 97,
4(a)(iii).
189 Id.
4(b)(v).
190 In fact, intent and good/bad faith appear in other areas of U.S. trademark law precedent as
well. Among the Polaroid factors for determining the likelihood of confusion, the "defendant's good
faith in adopting its own mark ... "is included. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d
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misplaced; damages in cybersquatting suits are often intangible and the best
evidence of wrongdoing may be circumstantial evidence pointing to the intent of the
registrant in implementing and/or registering the domain name. However, where a
gripe site is the subject of the dispute, judicial bodies and UDRP panels may overstep
their bounds in relying upon intent.
Arguably, the bad faith element present in the ACPA and UDRP are in conflict
with the version of U.S. trademark law that existed prior to the enactment of those
frameworks. There is substantial agreement among the Courts of Appeal that "the
proper inquiry is not one of intent. In that sense, the Lanham Act is a strict liability
statute. If consumers are confused by an infringing mark, the offender's motives are
largely irrelevant."191 If this is indeed the thrust of U.S. trademark law, then it may
be argued that the reverse should also be true: if consumers are not confused by the
use of another's mark, then the offender's motives are largely irrelevant.
Correspondingly, it could be said that if the restraint of free speech in the context of
domain names is to be grounded in principles of trademark law, then it should not
matter if a registrant acts with an ulterior motive in registering a domain name; it
should only matter whether consumers are confused as to the source, sponsorship, or
affiliation of that domain name and the associated website content.
This approach is probably harmonious with the regulation of legitimate gripe
site disputes, which should not prove to confuse consumers, but it provides an
obvious loophole for true cybersquatters who register domain names for the purpose
of ransoming them back to interested trademark owners. In particular, when a
cybersquatter registers a domain name, but does not post any content at an
associated website, the possibility of confusion is essentially nonexistent, because the
mark is not being used in association with anything. But if there is evidence that the
registrant obtained the domain name with the intent to extort money from the
interested trademark owner, tribunals have generally found bad faith and favored
the trademark owner.192
The inquiry becomes more convoluted when a registrant is a direct competitor of
the target of its gripe site. Facially, the content of the speech on the gripe site may
appear to be purely noncommercial, First Amendment-protected critical speech, but
the underlying motives of the competitor may be more nefarious: to destroy
competition. However, they may not be; the right to voice criticism about an entity is
not limited to those who are not in competition with that entity, and if such criticism
492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). Likewise, additional damages are available for trademark dilution that is
the product of "willful intent." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5)(B)(i)-(ii).
191Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 775 (6th Cir. 2003).
192See, e.g., E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting
that defendant had made a business practice of selling domain names on eBay for no less than
$10,000); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1998) (posing famous
question: "[w]hy do you want to fund your attorney's purchase of a new boat (or whatever) when you
can facilitate the acquisition of 'PanaVision.com cheaply and simply instead?"); Ets Leobert, SARL v.
Jeonggon Seo, WIPO Case No. D2009-0004 (Apr. 8, 2009) (ordering transfer of the domain name and
noting that "[i]t is well established that registering a domain name for the primary purpose of
offering to sell, rent, or otherwise transfer the domain name for an amount in excess of the
registration cost is evidence that a domain name was registered and being used in bad faith");
Adidas-Salomon AG v. Vincent Stipo, WIPO Case No. D2001-0372 (May 14, 2001) (ordering transfer
of the domain names in light of evidence that they "were registered primarily for the purpose of
selling them to the Complainant or to a competitor of the Complainant for valuable consideration").
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serves the public good, it may be argued that it has merit, regardless of whether it
also benefits the speaker.
A speaker positioned thus may not act entirely
altruistically, but this does fact not necessarily diminish the value of the speech. The
Supreme Court, in its celebrated Central Hudson opinion, arrives at a similar
conclusion, declaring: "[n]or should the economic motivation of a speaker qualify his
constitutional protection; even Shakespeare may have been motivated by the
prospect of pecuniary reward." 9 3
Further, U.S. law is generally protective of noncommercial speech that may be
harmful to the reputation of another. If the owner of a trademark could "enjoin the
use of his mark in a noncommercial context found to be negative or offensive, then a
corporation could shield itself from criticism by forbidding the use of its name in
commentaries critical of its conduct."194
Nevertheless, the UDRP specifically provides that circumstances indicating that
a domain name registrant has "registered the domain name primarily for the purpose
of disrupting the business of a competitor" may serve as evidence of bad faith.195
Panels have correspondingly adopted this approach in reaching decisions. In one
UDRP proceeding, a panel held that a gripe site registrant acted in bad faith when it
registered the domain name <goldstashforcashsucks.com> and connected it to a
website that criticized its competitor. 9 6 The panel reached this conclusion despite
the absence of references or links to the Respondent's own competing business.1 97 In
another decision, the panel was particularly offended by a dissatisfied customer's
assertions on its gripe site and in correspondence stating that it would pursue its
First Amendment rights vigorously, to the detriment of the trademark owner, if
necessary.198 The panel interpreted this as a bad faith attempt to disrupt the
Complainant's business. 9 9
In part, the bad faith inquiry is confounded by the arguably vague provisions
included in the ACPA and the UDRP. The ACPA somewhat ambiguously mandates
that bad faith "shall not be found in any case in which the court determines that the
person believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of the domain
name was a fair use or otherwise lawful." 200 Likewise, the non-exhaustive nature of
the examples of bad faith enumerated in both the ACPA and the UDRP leave
substantial room for interpretation.
The Eleventh Circuit has taken a broad stance on the ACPA's bad faith
evidentiary requirement, noting that "[p]roving 'bad faith' is not enough. A defendant
is liable only where a plaintiff can establish that the defendant had a 'bad faith
intent to profit' . . . . We cannot read the words "intent to profit' out of the statute."20 '
193Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 580 (1980).

194 CPC Int'l., Inc. v. Skippy Inc., 214 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting L.L. Bean. Inc. v.
Drake Pubs. Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987)).
195UDRP, supra note 97, at
4(b)(iii).
19o HBT Jnvs., L.L.C. 4/b/a Valley Goldimine v. Christopher D. Bussing, WIPO Case No. D20101326 (Sept. 24, 2010).
197Id.
198See Reg Vardy Pie v. David Wilkinson, WIPO Case No. D2001-0593 (July 3, 2001) (ordering

transfer of several domain names from a dissatisfied customer who used them in association with a
noncommercial consumer gripe site).
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (dl)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
201S. Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Co., 575 F.3d 1235, 1246 (11th Cir. 2009).
200
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No such language appears in the UDRP, however, lending itself to results
inconsistent with U.S. law.
Further confusing the bad faith inquiry, at least one UDRP case suggests that if
a domain name was registered in good faith, its later use in bad faith is not enough to
satisfy the bad faith prong. 202 However, there are dissenting views among panelists
on this point.203
A few UDRP panels have recognized the difference between bad faith and
criticism. One panel, in declining to transfer a cybergriper's disputed domain name,
noted:
The UDRP has a narrow scope. It is meant to protect against trademark
infringement, not to provide a general remedy for all misconduct involving
domain names ....
The Respondent may be acting unfairly. He may be
engaged in unwarranted disparagement. He may be acting childishly. He
may be retaliating for having lost earlier Cybersquatting cases. But this
does not necessarily mean that he may be forced to transfer the accused
domain name to the complainant under the UDRP. 204
The ACPA and the UDRP were designed to proscribe the act of cybersquatting,
not to limit critical speech. Trademark law in the United States prior to the
enactment of the ACPA and implementation of the UDRP was designed in large part
to balance the interests of trademark owners with the need to allow others to use
trademarks freely in the context of non-commercial speech.
Setting aside the volumes of litigation, legislation, legislative intent, judicial
precedent, and scholarly opinion, the central argument behind gripe site domain
name disputes can be distilled to one central point of disagreement: whether
trademark owners have superior rights to domain names that are evocative of their
trademarks, vis-A-vis cybergripers who have already registered those domain names
for the purpose of conveying speech. Confusion, fair use, and bad faith are all simply
elements that tribunals apply in an attempt to determine who has superior rights.
When precedent is inconsistent, tribunals can apply these principles in a manner
that is sometimes preordained. Otherwise stated, the ACPA, the UDRP, and other
legislative frameworks are relied upon to reach determinations in gripe site domain
name disputes, but the tribunals that decide those disputes often find themselves
working with muddled precedent and multiple sources of law; consequently, those
tribunals can usually adapt some grain of precedent to reach a desired conclusion.
This, of course, only leads to greater inconsistency. Such inconsistency serves to
confuse the parties who participate in the domain name space: trademark owners,
cybergripers, and by extension, the public. Ultimately, this may serve as a growing
disincentive for these parties to depend upon domain names as reliable gateways to
Internet content.

202See A Nattermann & Cie GmbH v. Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc., WIPO Case D2010-0800
(Aug. 31, 2010).
20s Id. (dissenting opinion).
204
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. wallmartcanadasucks.com and Kenneth J. Harvey, WIPO Case No.
D2000-1104 (Nov. 23, 2000).
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V. THE DIMINISHING RELEVANCE OF DOMAIN NAMES

Gripe site dispute resolution inconsistencies are the growing pains inherent in
implementing a framework to address the legal issues that emerge in conjunction
with the arrival of new technology. The Internet presents particularly difficult
challenges for the law: it is a tool of extraordinarily broad scope and its evolution has
been rapid and continuous. In the tug-of-war between intellectual property rights
and free speech, the Internet provides enormous opportunities for speakers to
disseminate their views instantaneously to the world, and at the same time, it
provides a swift and dangerous tool for would-be infringers of intellectual property.
Legislation designed to address the exploitation of the Internet necessarily faces
the heavy burden of harmonizing laws with previously unforeseen technology, while
remaining relevant as that technology evolves. Confronted with such a moving
target, such legislation runs the risk of becoming quickly irrelevant.

A. The Evolution of Technological Spaces: Blogs and Other Social Media
The ACPA and UDRP were implemented specifically to resolve issues
concerning domain name rights and the scope of each has been narrowly construed in
this manner. For example, courts have held that the reach of the ACPA does not
extend to subdomains or to the resource paths of given URLs, because these are not
part of the domain name as it is identified by the statute. The Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit has advocated this view, focusing on the source-indicating power of
a domain name and the relatively weaker ability of a resource path to indicate source
for trademark purposes. 205 Other courts have reached similar conclusions, some
relying on the weak source-indicating capacity of resource paths and others centering
on the definition of the term "domain name" as it is used in the text of the ACPA. 206
This approach appears to be reasonable: consumers commonly view the domain
name portion of a URL as the central, most important segment of the address, since
205 Interactive

Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 696-97 (6th Cir.

2003); see Patmont Motor Werks, Inc. v. Gateway Marine, Inc., No. C96-2703, 1997 WL 811770, at
*4 n.6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 1997); PACCAR, Inc. v. Telescan Tech. L.L.C., 115 F. Supp. 2d 772, 780
(E.D. Mich. 2000).
206See Patmont, 1997 WL 811770 at *4 (holding that the presence of plaintiffs trademark in
the path of defendant's URL could not constitute a trademark violation due the unlikelihood that
the resource path would be viewed as an indication of source); Gregerson v. Vilana Fin., Inc., No. 061164, 2007 WL 2509718, at *6 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2007) (holding that the URL
<http://www.cgstock.com/essays/vilana.html>, which contained plaintiffs VILANA trademark, was
not subject to scrutiny under the ACPA because the dictionary definition of "URL" described a
"domain name" as being separate and apart from a resource path); see also Goforit Entm't. L.L.C. v.
Digimedia.com L.P., No. 3:08-CV-2011, 2010 WL 4602549, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2010).
Concluding that:
[u]nder the statute, the term 'domain name' means any alphanumeric designation
which is registered with or assigned by any domain name registrar, domain name
registry, or other domain name registration authority as part of an electronic
address on the Internet .. .. The only part of a web address that must be
registered is the second level domain. Establishing a third level domain does not
require registration with or assignment by a domain name registration authority.
Id.
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this is the minimum (and typically default) portion of a URL that a user is required
to input in a web browser address box in order to reach a given website. In this
sense, the likelihood of confusion is attenuated when a mark is used in some less
prominent portion of the URL. For example, an Internet user viewing the URL
<http://www.allaboutwatches.com/us/timex> is far less likely to presume that the
domain name owner or website owner is affiliated with or endorsed by Timex than
the same user viewing <http://www.timex.com>.
It is also clear that resource paths and subdomains are beyond the scope of the
UDRP. In its guidelines, WIPO has indicated that "the UDRP Administrative
Procedure is only available for disputes concerning an alleged abusive registration of
a domain name." 207 Because subdomains and resource paths cannot be registered,
they are not within the reach of the UDRP; this is consistent with the legal basis of
the UDRP, since the Policy is binding upon a party only once that party specifically
registers a domain name. WIPO and NAF panel decisions have offered explicit
support for this position as well. 208
In the most basic sense, this seems logical. One could imagine that a URL with
a subdomain like <http://timex.allaboutwatches.com> would present a reasonably low
likelihood of consumer confusion, because most consumers accustomed to domain
names would focus on the domain itself as a source indicator, rather than the
subdomain. However, changing the nature of the URL could present a different
impression. For example, consider the following hypothetical: a party registers the
generic domain name <motorcycles.com> and uses it to sell an assortment of
aftermarket motorcycle parts. The user decides to employ subdomains to categorize
the items available through its website, relative to the manufacturer of the various
motorcycles for which parts are available. One subdomain points to parts for Harley
Davidson motorcycles, another to parts for Suzuki motorcycles, and so on. The
corresponding
URLs
might
include
<http://harley.motorcycles.com>
and
<http://suzuki.motorcycles.com>.
Here, the potential for consumer confusion is likely greater.
Even those
consumers accustomed to attributing source solely to the domain name itself rather
than to the subdomain might be persuaded to read these URLs more literally as
"Harley Motorcycles" and "Suzuki Motorcycles." And indeed, trademark owners may
unintentionally encourage this kind of consumer impression by creating their own
subdomain-domain
combinations
in
this
precise
fashion,
e.g.,
<shop.elizabetharden.com>. 209
The inapplicability of the ACPA and UDRP to subdomains and resource paths
seems trivial in the grand scheme of domain name disputes, until one considers the

207See UDRP, supra note 97.
208See Romantic Tours, Inc. v. Whois Privacy Protection Service, Inc., NAF Claim No.
FA1003001316557 (Apr. 28, 2010) (stating "[t]he Panelist notes that the UDRP does not offer relief
for infringements via use of registered trademarks in post-domains and that the proceedings under
the UDRP may be applied only to domain names."); Kosmea Pty Ltd. v. Carmel Krpan, WIPO Case
No. D2000-0948 (Oct. 3, 2000) (stating "[t]he Panel does not necessarily regard use of 'kosmea' as a
directory name (as part of the URL path) as objectionable. It is only use as a domain name that
creates an issue").
209 This URL resolves directly to the home page of beauty product retailer Elizabeth Ardien,
Inc.
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expansive use of this format in online blogS210 and other social media like Facebook
and Twitter. In particular, many user blogs are hosted on third party platforms like
Blogger, TypePad, and WordPress, and these platforms frequently rely upon
subdomains to create unique URLs for their users. 211 For example, the URL format
for TypePad-hosted blogs is <x.typepad.com>, where "x" is the title that the user has
chosen for the blog. Likewise, WordPress-hosted blogs appear as <x.wordpress.com>
and Blogger-hosted blogs appear as <x.blogspot.com>. The sole element of the URL
that changes from user to user within a given blogging platform's URL is the blog
title, which constitutes the subdomain; the domain name itself remains constant.
Because of this domain name uniformity, Internet users may ignore the domain
name and instead regard the subdomain as a more likely indicator of the source of
the blog's content.
In addition, the significance of the subdomain in the context of blogs may
increase the subdomain's value in search engine algorithms, making it more likely
that a user searching for a term will see results connected to blog subdomains rather
than to domain names per se. For example, a user searching for a blog published by
Wal-Mart might perform an Internet search for the terms "walmart" and "blog."
Among the search results, the user might be presented with links to blogs accessible
at
<walmartsucksorg.blogspot.com>,
<walmartwatch.blogspot.com>,
and
<alwayslowprices.blogspot.com>. The first of these three URLs strongly suggests a
critical site in light of the inclusion of the pejorative term "sucks" in the blog name.
The second is less certain; "walmartwatch" may suggest a site endorsed by someone
other than Wal-Mart or a site endorsed by the retailer itself. The third URL, which
employs a popular Wal-Mart slogan, is arguably even less certain. 2 12 The user in
search of a blog hosted by the retail giant would have to follow the links in order to
determine whether they are endorsed by or critical of the trademark owner.
Confusion, particularly in the case of the last blog, is likely, at least initially.
Because the use of a trademark in a subdomain is beyond the reach of the ACPA
and the UDRP, trademark owners are equipped with fewer tools to combat
cybersquatting in the context of blogs. Correspondingly, critical commentators whose
genuine First Amendment speech has been consigned to relative obscurity may have
a viable medium in which to voice their criticism without apprehension that it will be
suppressed through overly-aggressive use of the streamlined ACPA or UDRP.
Blogging platforms, of course, typically employ user agreements that prohibit
users from engaging in overt acts of intellectual property infringement, including
acts akin to cybersquatting. These agreements typically require users to submit to
terms of service that include prohibitions against trading on another party's
trademark or identity, sometimes referred to as "name squatting." For instance,
WordPress requires bloggers to agree to the following provision: "your blog is not
named in a manner that misleads your readers into thinking that you are another
person or company. For example, your blog's URL or name is not the name of a
210 MVERRIAMV-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 133 (11th ed. 2005).

that contains an online personal
by the writer."
211 See TYPEPAD,

A blog is 'a Web site

journal with reflections, comments, and often hyperlinks provided

http://www.typepad.com

(last

visited Oct.

16,

2011);

BLOGGER.COM,

http://www.blogger.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2011); and WORDPRESS.COM, http://wordpress.com (last
visited Oct. 16, 2011).
212 In fact, all three URLs lead to blogs that contain commentary critical of Wal-Mart.
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person other than yourself or company other than your own."2 1 3 Hence, while the use
of another's trademark within a blog subdomain falls outside the scope of the ACPA
and UDRP, such use may be governed instead by private entities with their own
interests.
The implications of this arrangement are readily illustrated by the regulation of
name squatting in newer forms of social media like Facebook and the micro-blogging
client Twitter. These clients insert usernames in the resource path of each user's
unique page. 214 For example, user John Doe's Twitter feed might appear at
<http://www.twitter.com/johndoe>; the same user might also choose "John Doe" as
his Facebook username, resulting in the URL <http://www.facebook.com/johndoe>.
Name squatters take advantage of this configuration by registering usernames that
are similar or identical to the trademarks of well-known entities, in the hope of
somehow monetizing the traffic drawn to that account through the suggested
association with the mark. Searching for a Twitter or Facebook username will
generate search results that are similar to that username, including usernames that
are synonymous with trademarks. For example, entering the term "walmart" in
Twitter's native user search engine reveals a long list of Twitter user accounts
incorporating the Wal-Mart trademark, less than half of which are legitimately
connected to the retail giant itself. These accounts are used for everything from
noncommercial critical speech to pure commercial use. One such account, labeled
"wakeupwalmart," bills itself as "America's Campaign to Change Wal-Mart,"
seemingly a forum for protected critical speech. 215 Another search result includes
"WalmartReview," which redirects users to <http://twitter.com/walmartreview>,
where the user has posted only two comments:
Buy this powerful Twitter site right now for $125 and start a massive
newsletter to get the message out #Walmart.
What would it take for your [sic] to obtain this site right now and start one
of the strongest newsletters ever? Help #Walmart . . . . Only $125.216
The user who
strategy borrowed
attract users who
intention is clear,

created the "WalmartReview" Twitter account has implemented
from domain name cybersquatting by relying upon confusion to
search for "Wal-Mart" in Twitter's user account database. The
as well: the user has created the free account in the hope that

213 WordPress Terms of Service, WORDPRESS.COM, http://en.wordpress.com/tos (last visited Oct.
16, 2011).
214 Facebook did not initially employ this approach. Instead, Facebook assigned a random
number to each Facebook user's URL, e.g., <http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?ild=59856925>. In
2009, Facebook changed this policy to allow users to select a username to appear in their unique
URL. Notably, Facebook offered a "sunrise" period prior to this, during which trademark owners
could register their names in order to limit name squatting. See Blaise DiPersia, Coming Soon:
(June
9,
2009,
2:11
PM),
Usernames,
THE
FACEBOOK
BLOG
Facebook
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=90316352130; Dan Kelly, Time to Defend your Rights on
Facebook, DUETSBLOG (June 12,
2009), http://www.duetsblog.com/2009/06/articles/domainnames/time-to-defend-your-rights-on-facebook.
215 Located at http://twitter.com/#!/wakeup walmart.
216 See Twitter User Account Walmartreview, http://twitter.com/walmartreview (last visited
Oct. 16, 2011). The user account has been suspended, since publication of this article.
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someone will recognize its value and purchase it. The user also appears to portray its
intentions as an innocent opportunity to create speech ("get the message out").
Finally, the user has employed the use of a hash tag to promote visibility, if not
confusion: the inclusion of "#walmart" in each of its tweets has the effect of grouping
"WalmartReview" with other results that contain the same hash tag when a user
searches the Twitter database for "Wal-Mart."
Other accounts that appear in the "Wal-Mart" Twitter database search results
include "StopHtsWalMart" and "People of Walmart." The former contains tweets
protesting the planned development of a Wal-Mart in the Houston Heights
community of Houston,
Texas.
Both the Twitter feed, located
at
<http://twitter.com/StopHtsWalMart>
and the affiliated website located at
<http://stopheightswalmart.org> make liberal use of the Wal-Mart trademark in a
nominative fashion and neither contain commercial content or links thereto. All of
the content is positioned to protest the proposed retail store and the initiative that
sponsors the site is, reportedly, a non-profit organization established to support local
businesses. 217
Analogous content is hosted on Facebook's servers at
<http://www.facebook.com/StopHeightsWalMart> and, like its Twitter equivalent,
the "Stop the Heights Wal-Mart!" Facebook page is discoverable upon searching
Facebook's native search engine for the term "walmart."
In contrast, "People of Walmart" is a commercial site masquerading as satire.
The account holder uses the Wal-Mart trademark in its account name and within its
Twitter feed and Facebook page to redirect attention to its website located at
<www.peopleofwalmart.com>. This website, which hosts user-submitted, awkward
photos of Wal-Mart shoppers, is a self-described "satirical social commentary of the
extraordinary sights found at America's favorite store." 21 8 However, the website also
features a robust online retail store selling "People of Walmart"-branded products.
Further, the site contains banner ads and click-through advertising to other online
merchants, some of which feature the same products that are sold at Wal-Mart.
While it is clear that the content located at the <www.peopleofwalmart.com> website
is at least partially satirical, it is doubtful that the domain name would survive
traditional Lanham Act, ACPA, or UDRP scrutiny, because the site contains both
non-commercial and commercial elements and the domain name itself is not
unmistakably pejorative.
In a culture of ephemeral web content, Facebook and Twitter are part of the
technology of the moment. Facebook currently features more than 750 million active
users who spend over 700 billion minutes per month perusing its pages,21 9 while
Twitter boasts more than 145 million users of its own. 220 The potential to leverage
these clients as a platform for speech is enormous. In contrast to the World Wide
Web as a whole, social networks specifically drive connectivity between users,
increasing the likelihood that users will view and recycle content by creating both
217 See RUDHI LOCAL BUSINESS COALITION, http://stopheightswalmart.org/rudlh-local-businesscoalition (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
218 See
About
The
People
of
Walmart,
PEOPLE
OF
WALMART,
http://www.peopleofwalmart.com/about-the-people-of-walmart (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
219 Facebook
Company
Statistics,
FACEBOOK.COM,
http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
220 Evan
Williams,
The Evolving Ecosystem,
TWITTER.COM
(Sept.
2,
2010),
http://blog.twitter.com/2010/09/evolving-ecosystem.html.
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search-based results and feed-driven results. For example, a user may encounter
speech about the initiative to stop the development of a Wal-Mart retail store in
Houston by searching Facebook or Twitter for the term "walmart"; but a user may
also encounter the same speech when it is reposted by other people familiar to the
user. The latter scenario serves to propagate speech rapidly, as users sympathetic to
one another are likely to share content through the streamlined medium of social
networks.
Like blogging platforms, the terms of service to which a user must agree in order
to establish a Twitter or Facebook account contain express prohibitions against the
unauthorized use of others' trademarks and provide remedies for alleged
infringement of this nature. 22 1 Both Facebook 222 and Twitter 223 explicitly prohibit
"username squatting." Twitter offers a list of factors that it identifies as suggestive
of username squatting. 224 Some familiar indicators appear in this list, including the
number of accounts created by a given user and the creation of such accounts "for the
purpose of selling those accounts." 225
At the same time, Twitter permits users to create parody, commentary, and fan
accounts. Accounts of this nature are allowable as long as they do not "try to deceive
or mislead others" about the account user's identity and as long as the username is
not "the exact name of the subject of the parody, commentary, or fandom." 226
These policies are clearly borrowed from cybersquatting legal frameworks like
the ACPA and the UDRP, but because username squatting falls outside the legal of
these frameworks, policing it is largely in the hands of the social media service
providers. Service providers like Twitter and Facebook may be sympathetic to
trademark owners, particularly when they are business partners who advertise with
the service provider, but at the same time, they have a financial incentive to respect
the interests of their users in order to maintain goodwill. In this sense, speech
advocates may have better footing vis-A-vis trademark holders than they do in the
domain name space, because they are initially subject to private rather than judicial
scrutiny.

221See Twitter Trademark Policy, TWITTER.COM, http://support.twitter.com/articles/18367trademark-policy (last visited Oct. 16, 2011); Facebook Terms of Service, FACEBOOK (Apr. 26, 2011),
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php (stating J[i]f you select a username for your account we reserve
the right to remove or reclaim it if we believe appropriate . . . such as when a trademark owner
complains about a username that does not closely relate to a user's actual name").
222Facebook Help Center, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=897

(last visited

Oct. 16, 2011).
223Twitter
Name
Squatting
Policy,
TWITTER.COM,
http://support.twitter.com/forums/26257/entries/18370 (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
224 See
Twitter
Help
Center,
The
Twitter
Rules,
TWITTER.COM,
http://support.twitter.com/articles/18311-the-twitter-rules (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
225Id.

226Twitter
Parody,
Commentary,
and
Fan Accounts
Policy,
TWITTER.COM,
(last visited
http://support.twitter.com/articles/106373-parody-commentary-and-fan-accounts-policy
Oct. 16, 2011).
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B. The Evolving Nature of Search
The manner in which Internet users search for content on the World Wide Web
is in a constant state of evolution. Through the growth of the Internet and the
explosion of its use by businesses as a retail and marketing tool, consumers have
become increasingly aware that typing a domain name directly into the address box
of an Internet browser may yield a result other than that which was sought. Such
users typically turn to search engine queries instead. For example, an Internet user
interested in finding a website associated with Dove Chocolate bars may anticipate
that entering <dove.com> into the browser address box is just as likely to lead to the
website of the well-known Dove company that sells soap and other bath products.
Likewise, a consumer who has typed <delta.com> into a browser address box in the
past in search of Delta Faucets or Delta Dental Insurance may recall that that the
domain resolved instead to Delta Airlines. In such cases, the consumer may opt to
perform a search for "delta faucets" or "delta dental" in a search engine, knowing that
this will quickly yield a list of search results, among which the desired site will be
apparent.
The same logic may apply to users who seek websites affiliated with companies
that have commonly misspelled names, e.g. Oscar Mayer (frequently misspelled
Oscar Meyer) and Volkswagen (often misspelled Volkswagon). Users who are unsure
of the exact spelling may decline to experiment with entering domain names in a
browser address box when they know that a search query will quickly yield a spellcorrected list of results.
The increasing reliance by users upon search engines to locate websites has
gained momentum through the efforts of search engine developers like Google and
Microsoft, which market the speed and accuracy of their services. Google has
experienced unqualified financial success by inserting itself between the user and the
Internet as a kind of gateway to content. In doing so, entities like Google become
intermediaries in the user's Internet search. This is significant for a number of
reasons. First, search engine providers choose how search results will be displayed.
Most search engines display a list of results and each result in the list is subdivided
into three parts: (1) the website title is featured prominently; (2) beneath the title
appears a "snippet" of the site's content, i.e., a short abstract or sample of content
that appears on the site; and (3) beneath the snippet appears the actual website
address, which contains the domain name. In Google and Bing search results, the
domain name itself is always listed at the bottom of each result and it appears in a
font substantially smaller than the title.
Eye tracking experiments have revealed that the majority of users who view
such search results spend little or no time looking at the site address portion of each
search result; rather, users tend to scan from title to title and snippet to snippet in
an abbreviated fashion before clicking on one of the results. 22 7 In attempting to
determine whether a result is consistent with the information a user seeks, the user

227See Mari-Carmen Marcos & Cristina Gonzilez-Caro, Comportamiento de los Usuarios en la
Pdgina de Resultados de los Buscadores. Un Estudio Basado en Eye Tracking, 19 EL PROFESIONAL
DE LA JNFORMAClIN 348, 357 (2010), translation available at http://dlynamical.biz/blog/webanalytics/serps-user-behaviour-eye-tracking-studly-32.html.
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typically ignores the website address. 228 Further, when a user clicks on a result and
is directed to a website, the user is likely to focus his or her attention immediately on
the content of the site itself, without noting the website address that appears in the
address bar. In this manner, search engine providers deemphasize the relevance of
domain names by diminishing the part that they play in guiding a user to content.
Further, the line between type-in traffic and search traffic has begun to blur. In
recent years, most browsers have featured both an address box, where the user can
enter a website address, and a search box, where the user can enter a search term to
query. By contrast, Google's Chrome browser, which was introduced in 2008 and has
gained a steadily increasing share of the browser market, 229 features the "Omnibox,"
which combines the functionality of both a traditional address bar and a search box.
Hence, users searching for Wal-Mart on the Internet can type "walmart.com" into the
Omnibox and they will be directed to the website located at <www.walmart.com>, or
they can simply type "walmart" into the Omnibox, in which case they will be directed
to a search results page relevant to their query. Users who become accustomed to
using the Omnibox for both purposes may be more likely to refrain from typing a
syntax-sensitive URL (e.g. http://www.mitsubishicars.com) in deference to simply
typing an approximation of what they seek ("mitsubishi").
The foregoing factors tend to lessen the importance of domain names to users
and they may affect free speech and trademark rights in the context of the Internet
in several ways. First, search engines have the ability to reduce consumer confusion
in the trademark sense. As users transition away from type-in search, the likelihood
of their confusion should also decrease, as they elect to choose from among a list of
detailed search results, rather than relying upon simple trial and error. This has not
escaped the attention of at least one WIPO panel, which noted:
in the early days of the Internet, users would routinely type in a URL
incorporating a mark, expecting to find the site of the trademark owner.
Nowadays search engines are frequently used instead to display numerous
links generated by the search term used. Users select the link to a site
without the same expectation of finding the site of the trademark owner
and, upon reaching a site they immediately perceive to be the wrong one,
they return to their search engine to find the site they want. Hence, today
there may be less likelihood of confusion. 230
For example, an Internet user who employs Google's search engine to search for
"walmart" will be provided with a list of search results consisting of many pages.
Whether the gripe site located at <www.peopleofwalmart.com> is listed near the top
of those search results will depend upon a calculation by Google's search algorithm.
Correspondingly, the position of this gripe site in the search results will have some
effect on whether users believe, at least initially, that <www.peopleofwalmart.com>
228 Id.
229 See Internet Explorer Browser Share Dips as Chrome Rises, PCWORLD.COM (Oct. 5, 2010),
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/2070OO/internet-explorer-browser-sharedips-as-ch
rome rises.html.
2so Gnarls Barkley, L.L.C. v. Pax Stereo, NAF Claim No. FA0808001221421 (Oct. 12, 2008)
(ordering transfer of <gnarlsbarkley.tv> to multiple-Grammy-awardi-winning musical group Gnarls
Barkley).
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is sponsored, affiliated with, or endorsed by Wal-Mart. If it appears close to the top
of the search results, there is probably more likelihood of confusion, at least of the
initial interest variety. If it appears lower, the likelihood is correspondingly lower.
The use of search engines inserts entities like Google into the conflict between
free speech and trademark rights in cyberspace. In designing, refining, and utilizing
their complex search algorithms, search engine providers position themselves as
active participants in determining the nature of the content that users are likely to
see as they interact with the Internet. Google's current search algorithm is a
technologically enormous leap forward from the early days of the World Wide Web,
when search engines could be very easily manipulated by clever website creators to
divert traffic to their websites. 23 1 And while it is still vulnerable to a certain degree
of manipulation, the Google search algorithm was designed to produce accurate
results and it does this extraordinarily well. However, there is an argument that
Google and other search engine providers may do this too well. Specifically, search
algorithms that tweak a user's experience to fit the individual user's search criteria
and search habits create a kind of filter through which the user's Internet experience
passes. Google has done this by increasingly relying upon its users' search history to
provide results that are better tailored to each user's interests. 232 Arguably, this
limits the information that a user encounters and it effectively diminishes the
likelihood that a user will be exposed to speech that might challenge or expand the
user's ideological framework.
In effect, highly accurate search engine results
neutralize the classic soapbox effect that has been a vehicle for disseminating speech
throughout history.
Trademark owners might argue that this effect is a necessary consequence of
preventing confusion on the Internet that might otherwise diminish the value of their
marks. Speech advocates would likely offer the view that the cost is too high to the
public: the shift to reliance upon search engines substantially attenuates the
communicative nature of the Internet, diminishing the flow of information.

C. The Dilution of the Domain Name System
As companies like Google slowly pull users away from domain names as search
instruments in favor of their own search tools, ICANN may be inadvertently nudging
users in the same direction. New domain name hierarchy protocols are on the near
horizon which will expand the domain name space to "allow for a greater degree of
innovation and choice." 233 However, it may be argued that this expansion will only
231See Saul Hansell, Google Keeps Tweaking its Search Engine, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2007,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/03/businessyourmoney/03google.html (explaining that
Google's trade secret-protected search algorithm is said to consider more than 200 "signals" in
analyzing and ranking web pages).
232 Google
'Personalizes' One
in Five Searches, REGISTER
(Mar.
3,
2010),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/03/03/googlepersonalized search explained; see What is a
Custom
Search
Engine?,
GOOGLE.COM,
en&answer=70308 (last visited Oct.
http://www.google.com/support/customsearch/bin/answer.py?hl
16, 2011).
233Ne
gTLD Program, INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS,
http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtld-program.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
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push Internet users closer to relying upon search engines to locate content on the
Internet.
At present, .com domain names account for a disproportionately high 75% of all
generic TLDs registered. 234 The remaining 25% are comprised of .net, .org, .info, and
.biz.235 The number of businesses (as opposed to the general public) using the .com
TLD rather than one of the other generic TLDs is almost certainly even higher.
Because of this, consumers who search for websites on the Internet via the type-in
approach typically default to .com as their TLD of choice; i.e., a type-in user
searching for Wal-Mart's website on the Internet will most likely attempt
<walmart.com> first. In addition, most Internet browsers append .com by default to
any keyword entered into a browser address box if the user types simply the keyword
and then strikes the CTRL + ENTER keys.
Recognizing that the narrow use of existing generic TLDs and over-reliance on
the .com TLD may be detrimental to innovation and to the ability of entities to create
digital identities, ICANN introduced a new initiative in 2008 to explore the
possibility of expanding the number of TLDs, potentially by the thousands. 236
ICANN's program is currently nearing implementation, and it will differ from the
current registration process in several respects. At present, if a person or entity
wishes to acquire a domain name, the name can simply be purchased through any of
the multitude of existing domain name registrars, as long as the desired second level
domain is available. ICANN's new approach will allow any organization to apply to
become the registrar of its own proposed generic TLD, ranging in length from 3-63
characters. 237 For example, the well-known camera equipment manufacturer Canon
will be able to apply to administer a new .canon TLD. 238 Canon would then be able to
use its TLD to create domains like <my.canon>, <support.canon>, <products.canon>,
and so on. In effect, a new TLD registrar could arrange to have any second level
domain name used in combination with its TLD redirect users to a valid web page.
For example, a user who types <[x].canon> into its browser address box, where "x" is
any combination of letters and numbers, could be redirected to an active Canon web
page such as <home.canon>.

234 See
Global
Domain
Registry
Statistics,
WEBHOSTING.INFO,
http://www.webhosting.info/registries (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
235 See id.
23c)New gTLDs-Frequently Asked Questions, INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND
NUMBERS, http://icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/strategy-faq.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
237These domains will fall into a wide range of categories, including cities (e.g., nyc and
.paris), regions (.africa, bay), communities (.gay, eco), ethnicities (.zulu, kurd), specialized interests
(.money, videos), and branded domains (.canon, .deloitte).
238In fact, Canon has announced its intention to do so. See Canon to Begin Acquisition of the
".canon"
Top-Level
Domain
Name,
CANON
(Mar.
16,
2010),
available
at
http://www.canon.com/news/2010/marl6e.html.
Other
companies
have
made
similar
announcements. See Navin Ganeshan, Beyond .Dot .Com-The New Wild Wild West for Business
Identity,
NETWORKSOLU~TIONS.COM
(Dec.
17,
2010),
http://www.networksolutions.com/blog/20 10/beyond-dot-comn-the-new-wild-wild-west-for-businessidentity.
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The application process will be both lengthy 239 and expensive,240 but if approved,
an organization will be able to administer its own TLD and generate an essentially
infinite number of domain names under that TLD. Approval will be limited to
organizations; individuals and sole proprietors will not be permitted to obtain new
TLDs, ostensibly due to the complexity and required resources involved. 241 Further,
approval will be preceded by an application and evaluation phase, following which
proposed TLDs will be published for opposition by the public, much the way U.S.
trademark applications are published for opposition prior to final allowance. 242
ICANN's current plan to introduce new gTLDs differs markedly from the
approach it has employed in the past to enlarge the domain name space. Specifically,
ICANN has previously attempted to relieve some of the demand for .com domain
names by expanding gTLDs to include .biz, .info, .name, .museum, and others,
through the same approach used to register .com, .net. and .org domain names.
Despite this, the popularity of .com as the gTLD of choice has been affected very little
by the introduction of new domain names, as consumers continue to default to .com
as the most likely location for the content they seek. 243 However, ICANN's new
approach may affect Internet users differently.
Assuming that the opposition process is rigorous, ICANN's new gTLD
registration process would appear to show a strong preference for trademark owners
vis-a-vis cybersquatters and cybergripers. From the trademark owner's standpoint,
acquisition and use of a TLD similar to one's trademark will likely be desirable,
because it will provide the owner with a monopoly on the full breadth of domain
names that incorporate its TLD. 244 Trademark owners may deem this approach
valuable because cybersquatters and cybergripers will presumably be prevented from
239 See New gTLDs-Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 236 (noting that the current
program is a result of an eighteen month long detailed and lengthy consultation process with all
constituencies of the global Internet community).
240 ICANN has proposed an application fee of US $185,000 per gTLD and an additional $25,000
per year for each successful new gTLD operator. See How to Apply for a New Generic Top-Level

Domain,
INTERNET
CORP.
FOR
ASSIGNED
NAMES
AND
NUMBERS,
(Oct. 1, 2011); Carolyn
http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-2-23oct08-en.htm
Duffy Marsan, ICANN: New Domains Coming in 2010, NETWORKWORLD.COM (June 24, 2009),
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2009/062409-icann-new-domains.html.
241See New gTLDs-FrequentlyAsked Questions, supra note 236.
242 Id.

213 See

Global

Domain

Registry

Statistics,

WEBHoSTING.INFO

(Oct.

1,

2011),

http://webhosting.info/registries. The .biz TLD, for example, presently accounts for only about 1.7%
of all TLDs registered, as compared to .com, which holds a 74.2% market share.
211 Latoicha Givens, ICANN's Introduces Customized Top Level Domain Names, BLACKWEB 2.0
(May 18, 2010), http://www.blackweb20.com/2010/05/18/icanns-introduces-customized-top-leveldomain-names! (stating "[b]rancl holders and organizations seeking to manage their own name as a

top-level domain may have an interest in securing these rights in the early phases of the new gTLD
program for future branding purposes'). JCANN has suggested as much:
brand holders and organizations seeking to manage their own name as a top-level
domain may have an interest in securing these rights in the early phases of the
new gTLD program for future branding purposes. With the limited availability of
.com domain names, so me companies may opt to become early adopters of new
TLDs to satisfy their marketing needs.
Id.; see INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, NEW GTLD PROGRAM: DRAFT
COMMUTNICATIONS PLAN 2 (2009), available at http:/www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/draft

communications-plan-oct09-en.pdlf.
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making use of the new TLDs, due to the opposition period, the prohibitive cost, and
the additional requirement that applications must originate from organizations,
rather than from individuals.
As the breadth of potential domain names widens almost infinitely, there is
theoretically more room for all parties to engage in the use of domain names as tools
for both commerce and speech. However, individuals and small entities may be
placed at a disadvantage in the new TLD framework, since they will be unable to
register such domains. This, of course, includes cybergripers, who are most often
individuals or small groups. Certainly, cybergripers will still be free to register and
use traditional second level domain names that are identical or confusingly similar to
their targets' trademarks, subject to the scrutiny of the ACPA and the UDRP.
Likewise, cybergripers will always be able to post critical speech at consumer
complaint
clearinghouse
websites
like
<www.ripoffreport.com>
and
<consumerreports.org>. But if cybergripers are indeed left out of the new TLD
acquisition process, they will be relegated to traditional second level domains as
gateways for critical speech and this may diminish their capacity to be heard. If both
companies and consumers embrace the new TLDs, an eventual division between the
domain names used commercially and those used non-commercially may occur, as
was previously envisioned when the .com and .org domain names were first created.
Cybergripers will no longer be able to rely upon the likelihood that consumers
seeking information about the targets of their criticism will encounter their gripe
sites, reducing their ability to reach an audience greater than those who directly seek
their advocacy.
Despite ICANN's best intentions, the creation of new TLDs may not only curtail
free speech, it may also ultimately result in diminished consumer reliance upon
domain names as search tools. The introduction of hundreds or thousands of new top
level domain names will provide trademark owners with greater assurance that they
will have exclusive control over domain names corresponding to their marks, but it
will likely also generate uncertainty among consumers. Specifically, if companies
embrace the new system, consumers will initially be at a loss as to whether to locate
a particular company via its .com address or at a proprietary TLD like .ibm. While
most large companies will simply seek to obtain both a .com domain and a new TLD,
the uncertainty that consumers experience in deciding where to locate such
companies on the Internet may lead to a whittling away of the value of domain
names as a whole. If this theory is correct, domain names will diminish in their
capacity to serve a distinguishing role and consequently consumers will rely more
heavily upon search engines as the default tools to locate content on the Internet.
This again places the moderation of free speech vis-A-vis trademark rights in the
hands of private entities like Google and outside of the reach of the UDRP and the
ACPA.

VI. THE FUTURE OF DOMAIN NAME DISPUTES

In a practical sense, the impact of this shift is only beginning to be felt. A user
interested in locating information about Red Lobster on the Internet will most likely
continue to type <redlobster.com> into a browser address box, at least in the near
term. The rate at which domain names are being registered continues to grow and
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there is no indication that this trend will change in the immediate future. 245
Likewise, the number of domain name disputes decided by tribunals has steadily
increased. 246 A review of WIPO and NAF statistics reveals that, aside from a single
low-point in 2003, the number of UDRP proceedings has increased every year. 247
This data would seem to suggest that domain names are still regarded as highlyvalued virtual property.
There is a counter argument, however: at least one commentator has suggested
that proportionally fewer UDRP proceedings are being instituted, as compared to the
rate at which domain name registrations are increasing. 248 Otherwise stated, the
increase in UDRP proceedings is not in step with the even greater concurrent
increase in domain name registrations, hence the percentage of disputes has actually
decreased over time.
If this is indeed the case, there are several possible
explanations for the proportional decrease in the number of disputes that are being
filed. On the one hand, this phenomenon may simply be attributable to the
increasing ability of targeted cybersquatting legislation to serve as a deterrent to
cybersquatters and cybergripers. It may also represent a natural distillation of
domain names that contain trademarks over the past fifteen years; that is to say,
over time, many of the largest trademark owners have gradually acquired domain
names that evoke their trademarks, leaving fewer opportunities for disputes.
Conversely, it may be argued that this effect is the product of a growing
tendency among trademark owners to defer from seeking resolution of domain name
disputes through UDRP proceedings and federal litigation. This tendency could be
explained by the uncertainty that trademark owners experience with respect to the
outcome of such proceedings. If trademark owners have indeed become jaded, they
will be less likely to avail themselves of domain name dispute remedies in all but the
most egregious cases.
Whatever the explanation, there is a real possibility that the relative number of
domain name disputes is diminishing and at least part of this effect may be
attributed to the perception that domain names are less critical tools than they once
were. In practice, most marketing professionals would likely disagree with this
premise, but ultimately the public will decide whether it relies upon domain names
for direction to Internet content, and marketers will follow suit. The foregoing
factors-new technological spaces like Facebook, decreased type-in search, and the
expansion of the domain name space to deemphasize the value of .com domain
names-may coalesce to divert the public interest away from domain names. If
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domain names do indeed give way to other technological spaces as the preferred tools
for driving traffic to commercial and critical speech on the Internet, the relevance of
the ACPA and UDRP will diminish as well.
Some signs of this may already exist. For example, meta tagS249 have become
increasingly the subject of disputes between trademark owners and speech
advocates. 250 Because meta tags are among the favored tools utilized by website
creators to drive traffic to their sites via search engines, their value will increase as
trademark owners, cybergripers, and cybersquatters rely upon search engines.
Several federal courts have already held that the unauthorized use of another's
trademark in the meta tags of commercial websites could cause consumer confusion
leading to trademark infringement. 251 Other courts have asserted that such use is
permissible if it is fair use; that is, when trademarks are used in meta tags solely to
refer to the trademark owner and to describe the content of the website itself.252 At
least one court has noted that the authority of the ACPA does not extend to meta
tagS253-nor would the UDRP have any authority to regulate in this realm.
As search engines grow in importance relative to domain names, trademark
owners and speech advocates will divert greater attention to optimizing their
websites to better appeal to search engine algorithms. This reliance on the practice
of search engine optimization ("SEO")254 is not new, but its value will likely continue
to grow proportionally to the diminishing value of domain names as search tools.
The impact of these changes may be a change in the manner that Activists,
Commercialists, and Squatters utilize the Internet. If domain names become the
less-desirable virtual property of yesterday, the competing parties who utilize them
219Meta tags are elements included in the HTML code that is the basis of websites. There
elements are noted by web crawling programs that review the source code of websites as they scour
the Internet. Such tags include, among other things, keywords and descriptions that the creator of
the web content believes to be relevant to the site content. Search engine algorithms assign varying
degrees of value to these elements as they perform calculations to generate search results. See Jerry
West,
Meta
Tags
Explained,
WEB
MTKG
Now
(May
6,
2011),
http://www.webmarketingnow.com/tips/meta-tags-uncovered.html.
250 A partial list of meta tag disputes compiled by Professor Eric Goldman can be found at
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has expressly stated that the ACPA does not apply to metatags, the plain meaning of the statute
and its legislative history make this conclusion apparent").
254 At its core, SEO is a web marketing strategy designed to boost the ranking of a web page in
search engine results and increase the quality of traffic that is directed to that page. For the most
part, this may be achieved by means of three central approaches: (1) modification of the viewable
content of each target page to make the page more attractive to search engines; (2) modification of
the transparent elements of the source code behind each target page to make the page more
attractive to search engines; and (3) monitoring and developing relationships with related websites
that may direct Internet traffic to the target page. A useful introduction to SEO may be found at
Beginner's Guide to SEO, SEOMOZ.ORG, http://guides.seomoz.org/beginners-guide-to-search-engineoptimization#1 (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
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will increasingly shift their focus on competing in other spaces. Search engines may
provide greater clarity and less confusion among Internet users, an effect that will
likely impact claims of infringement in the future. In turn, trademark and free
speech rights will be defined by different legislation, either through the revision of
existing statutes or the enactment of new legislation designed to meet the evolving
technical landscape. And so the cycle will repeat itself: trademark owners will
necessarily persist in defending their online investments in the goodwill associated
with their marks and in the reputation of their enterprises; speech advocates will
continue to avail themselves of the world's most advanced communication tool-the
Internet-to exercise their democratic rights to inform the public at large; and
cybersquatters will look for opportunities to monetize the Internet. It is a wrestling
match in cyberspace that will last as long as the Internet is relevant, which is likely
to be a very long time.
It is difficult to say whether the evolution of the still-young Internet and the
manner in which users interact with it will lead to more certainty or less for mark
owners and critical speakers.
The expanding Internet provides an increasing
spectrum of opportunities for both sides and its regulation will almost certainly
change as users avail themselves of those opportunities. Disagreements regarding
the manner in which that regulation is implemented will likely be the subject of
policy disputes for the foreseeable future.
Perhaps the long view is to regard skirmishes over domain names as a natural
distillation that must occur in the judiciary and the legislature in order to cultivate a
stable system of jurisprudence in response to societal changes, including those
changes that are the products of emerging technology. The ACPA and the UDRP are,
in that sense, merely transitional legislation put in place to combat inequities that
were previously unforeseeable. In this period of tremendous growth of the Internet,
the relevance of such legislation may well prove to be ephemeral.

